I haven't read the decision, but here are a couple of thoughts:
1. Sure, the Orioles can appeal the decision to the Appellate Division, First Department (which is obligated to the hear the appeal), and then to the New York Court of Appeals (which will be obligated to hear the appeal only under certain circumstances that are unlikely to occur), and then to the U. S. Supreme Court (if the Orioles want to waste some money).
But there's a critical difference from the last round of appeals. The Nats now have obtained (it appears, though again I haven't read the decision) the New York Supreme Court's confirmation -- that is, its approval -- of the second arbitration award. They didn't have that before; all the previous court decisions contemplated further arbitration proceedings.
Now, or possibly after waiting for pre-judgment interest to be calculated and added to the amount owed, the Nats have the right to obtain a judgment of a court in New York and then elsewhere compelling MASN (and/or the Orioles) to pay to the Nats the specific amount stated in the judgment (plus interest on that amount). MASN's and the Orioles' appeals will not affect their obligation to pay that amount, unless MASN and the Orioles either (a) provide security in that full amount, plus interest (by obtaining an "undertaking," which is like a bail bond, in which an insurance company or other deep pocket would promise to pay the judgment if MASN and the Orioles don't after they have finished appealing, or putting funds in the amount of the judgment aside in a manner that ensures the Nats they will be readily available to them when the appeals are over), or (b) get the Supreme Court or the First Department to say that payment need not be made while the appeals are pursued. Undertakings of this magnitude are hard to come by and very expensive, and I think MASN and the Orioles would have a tough time prevailing on an argument that their obligation to pay should be deferred after it's been determined in two arbitrations that they have very substantial payment obligations.
So while MASN and the Orioles can appeal, I think it's likely that pretty soon this arbitration award is going to start costing them real dollars, and lots of them.
2. Insofar as the result of the arbitration is deemed to be unfair or surprising to the Orioles, I believe the blame lies principally with themselves or their lawyers (and it's possible that Peter Angelos or lawyers in his firm played both roles). I prepared a long comment on this topic, which I never posted because it seemed too negative. What follows is, believe it or not, a summary of the two aspects in which it appears the Orioles or their lawyers laid the groundwork for these arbitration decisions.
First, when the Orioles agreed to the rights fee dispute resolution provision in the 2005 MASN Agreement, they didn't understand, or did understand but chose to ignore, what the RSDC does, and failed to insist on a definition of "[t]he fair market value of the rights" that would have clarified what the RSDC was supposed to decide. While "fair market value" has a standard meaning and therefore ordinarily doesn't require a definition, that standard meaning doesn't logically fit in with the rest of this provision, including the reference to the RSDC's "established methodology." As a result, the rights fee dispute resolution provision, rather than being clear and direct about what the RSDC is supposed to do, is subject to differing interpretations. (Even though I believe that under an exacting legal analysis, only one interpretation works, I understand that others disagree.) Moreover, prescribing a determination of "fair market value" gives the decision-maker wide latitude as to both methodology and result. There is no single "correct" value, and it's hard to say most values are "wrong." So the RSDC was given wide scope in deciding future rights fees.
Second, practically any practitioner or handbook about arbitrations will say that when you agree to have important issues decided by arbitration your most important decision is the selection of the arbitrator(s), since it's virtually certain you'll have to live with their decision even if it's unfair, incompetent, or just plain wrong. There are various recognized methods in which to optimize the likelihood that arbitrators will have the expertise to decide the issues before them, unbiased and fair. None of them was used here. Instead, the MASN agreement provides what I'd call a "pig in a poke" method: future rights fees would be decided by the three MLB owners who would be the members of the RSDC (which changes membership on a regular basis) at unidentified future times. Those future members might or might not be competent to understand and apply the rights fee provision, and might or might not favor, as a personal or business matter, MLB or the Nats. (Given Angelos's status among MLB owners, I doubt there was much possibility of bias in his favor among RSDC members.)
When you put these two things together, the Orioles agreed in 2005 that disputes over the amounts of post-2011 rights fees -- an issue of importance to the franchise's long-term financial health -- would be decided by three not-yet-identified MLB owners, who might like or dislike the Orioles or the Nats, and might simply do MLB's bidding. Those three owners would be asked to determine the rights fees by applying their interpretation of a provision whose meaning was internally incoherent, and the Orioles/MASN would be stuck with their decision. It wouldn't matter what the dispute provision "really" meant, or what the Orioles thought it meant, if the arbitrators -- or their puppet-masters in MLB -- had a different interpretation. That's what the Orioles agreed to, either because they and their lawyers didn't bother to clarify what the rights fee dispute provision meant, or because they decided to sign on to a crapshoot as to how future rights fees would be decided. They are now stuck with the consequences. It could have been worse.
3. I don't know enough about the Orioles' finances or financial resources to know how much this determination of rights fees, and those to come if they follow the same methodology and formula, will affect the team. Even without a good handle on those facts, I continue to believe that the obligations of Peter Angelos's estate to pay federal estate taxes and Maryland taxes upon his death (which can be deferred insofar as he leaves his interest in the Orioles and his other assets to his wife) will weaken the franchise financially such that (a) MLB may not approve a transfer, for example one to Angelos's sons, that triggers those tax obligations, and (b) Angelos's sons would need additional investors in the franchise, and might sell the team.