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BobDylanBundy

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About BobDylanBundy

  • Birthday 05/30/1982

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Major Leaguer Cup of Coffee (7/14)

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  1. Soccer is a different beast altogether due to the promotion/relegation. Unlike baseball, there are tangible consequences for teams being terrible, and it creates a degree of (perhaps artificial) competitive balance at the primary level by segregating the throwaway teams from the legitimate ones. This could actually solve several problems for MLB, but would never happen. Baseball is uniquely tied to its measured history, and a change like this would corrupt the sacred statistics of star players on relegated teams. This would also be a death sentence for a handful of very small market teams (that you could admittedly argue shouldn't exist regardless). It would likely increase spending as well, since there'd now be teams spending to avoid relegation in addition to the ones already spending to try to compete. ** I could see an argument that the old player bargain bin could be more reliable than the young - you have a deeper track record supporting buying decisions, and decline due to age would probably be less significant than young player failure rates. However, there's no way the same level of upper tier talent would be available. There's plenty of All-Star (and better) production from players in club-controlled years right now. Established 30+ year olds who'd have bargain bin salaries and still be capable of that level of production are basically nonexistent. ...and its competely on the backburner on the continent where MLB is played. Soccer is indeed evidence of the existence of an opposite extreme, but it hardly qualifies as a counter argument. Salary structure is virtually irrelevant compared to geography as its success driver. I completely agree with you here. This is really the inciting point of most of the problems discussed (though I'm not sure a salary floor is the best solution), and you honestly can't blame the teams for operating this way. Anything more than minimal Major League spending for a non-contending season is irrational for the team in the current environment - there is little, if any, benefit to winning 60-70 games instead of 40-50. Allocating that money elsewhere or completely saving it would contribute more to the health of the individual franchise. However, the damage created for MLB is teams across the league are now comprised of unfamiliar faces the fans have no connection to, and competitive balance at the bottom of the league is openly a joke. But the system is the problem, the teams are only doing what makes the most strategic sense.
  2. My issue with this is I'm not sure 180 is the number we should be looking at. As someone pointed out earlier, a player doesn't necessarily need to spend literally every inning with the same team to achieve what the original poster was looking for. Frank Thomas spent 16 years with the White Sox, he was integral to the team's identity; a few partial seasons with other teams tacked onto the end to prolong his career doesn't change anything. I would view this as, on a whole, making things worse rather than fixing them. Particularly in the context of this thread. I can see the benefits to more equitable salary distribution. You achieve better 'fairness' for players on a moral level when salaries go toward production actually deserving it. Also, if money is going to younger players, it's not hard to reason that teams will make fewer poor spending decisions. Two big wins in principle, but I'd really question if the outcomes are making a serious change - let alone improvement - to the game at all. Meanwhile, this comes at a cost of significant negatives: As the original poster alluded to, the out of control player movement is killing interest in the game. Teams have no identity, and fans are (rightfully) hesitant about any kind of connection with a roster because its almost a certainty the significant players will be shuffled off within a few seasons. Your change ramps up player movement to an even larger scale, escalating the problem. If the "old player bargain bin" is worse than the value gained from club-controlled young players now, this change HURTS competitive balance by favoring whoever spends the most money. The Tampa Bays of the world would have basically zero chance at ever contending in this environment. Currently, a Wander Franco can come up and give them six years of All-Star production at an affordable salary. If the salary structure changes to favor younger players, then the Francos become unaffordable almost immediately. Its very unlikely they would be able to find equivalent value from 30+ year old free agents with established track records that they need to compete with 29 other teams to sign. You can achieve higher salaries for young players with rule changes, such as changing club controlled years to arbitration or eliminating them altogether. I'm not buying that this would induce an equally proportional reduction in salaries for older players. Veteran salaries would drop some because there's not unlimited money out there; but you almost certainly see payrolls across the board rise as well (rather than a direct dollar-for-dollar tradeoff/redistribution). As payrolls rise, individual salaries follow, and the gap between large/upper-mid and small market teams increases.
  3. I suspect the outcome of that change would really just make the problem identified in this thread even *worse*. This would only result in star players being dealt earlier in their careers, since their earnings would be higher. The small market teams outside of their competitive window have zero motivation to carry ANY big salary player, young or old. A team like the Orioles can currently carry a John Means type through the losing seasons because his contract is still low; if he was making $12 million this year, he'd almost certainly be gone.
  4. I completely agree this is hurting the game, but I think it's just a side effect of the main problem - team building strategies have evolved to the point that there's no middle ground anymore, either you're competing or you're rebuilding and there's nothing in between. No team currently wants to carry a superstar salary during the rebuilding years, so you rarely see them retained for 10+ years. Forget keeping the Yankees and Red Sox competitively balanced with other good teams, the larger problem of today is the bad teams deliberately descending to terrible. Identifiable, homegrown stars across a league in which every team is making a serious effort to compete would be a glorious environment for the sport. Unfortunately, the good of the game runs contrary to the individual success of each team. There are undeniably better results following a win-lose-win cycle of extremes than being 'pretty good' year in and year out. Having a star player on your roster during a down year is an enormous competitive mistake within the current rule structure.
  5. I don't think they will even have an opportunity on Leiter, but I'd definitely go for Rocker. Would also be fine with Mayer or Lawler if they fall to us. Not a fan of House unless they think he can stick at SS and the C's seem unnecessarily risky given the other options available. I'm against picking Jobe, but have confidence in Elias if he goes in that direction. I'm having a tough time believing some of the other names associated with us.
  6. Will admit I often find myself at odds with much of what you post, but this one is right on the money. If Santander was on another team, most of this forum would balk at offering anything of value for him in trade (or even pursuing at all). He is a Rule V success story and has offered some nice power production at a low cost - but he is not the type of player we should be keeping around at a higher cost.
  7. Stewart is one month younger than Shaw. This should be irrelevant in comparing their prospect status, and speed is hardly one of Stewart's optimal characteristics. Stewart's OBP history is significantly influenced by a slower development schedule. Here's how their minors offense compares year by year (both players the same age and drafted/signed the same year).... 2016 Shaw - A+ - .285/.357/.544 in 305 PA Shaw - AA - .246/.309/.414 in 256 PA Stewart - A - .230/.366/.352 in 262 PA Stewart - A+ - .279/.389/.448 in 240 PA 2017 Shaw - AA - .301/.390/.511 in 154 PA Shaw - AAA - .289/.328/.530 in 360 PA Stewart - AA - .278/.378/.481 in 540 PA 2018 Shaw - AAA - .259/.308/.505 in 422 PA Stewart - AAA - .235/.329/.387 in 490 PA 2019 Shaw - AA - .288/.368/.500 in 182 PA Shaw - AAA - .298/.355/.592 in 310 PA Stewart - AAA - .291/.396/.548 in 277 PA I wouldn't necessarily say Shaw's development looks better, but is not clearly worse either.
  8. I wasn't a huge Chris Shaw advocate, but there's not a whole lot separating him and DJ Stewart. There's a few pitchers on the 40-man I would have cut before either.
  9. The Hardy trade was an excellent move but, in retrospect, the extension was probably one of the ten worst signings in the history of the franchise
  10. Not to detract from this great analysis, but I will also point out that direct Major League production is not the only value created by an amateur signing. Prospects are a MLB team's greatest trade currency. Yoan Moncada actually contributed negative rWAR to the Red Sox, but he generated a great deal of value for the team anyway by being the primary component in the Chris Sale trade. I am not as ambitious as Frobby to research all of the examples, but I'm sure there's several high dollar international signings that never even appeared in the Majors yet produced great value for the signing team by being included in a trade while they were still a prospect.
  11. I'm not sure how much I buy into athletic ability passing down from parent to child, but there is definitely a physical component and I suspect there's great benefit to having a parent who has experienced the Major League culture/preparation and is connected with the highest level of instruction. Even if a Ryan Ripken type is a dud, I could see a scout or front office personnel believing he is better positioned to fulfill his potential than a similar amateur coming from a family of office workers.
  12. Norfolk SS Richie Martin UT Rylan Bannon Bowie 2B Terrin Vavra UT Mason McCoy Delmarva 2B Adam Hall SS Jordan Westburg UT Cadyn Grenier Aberdeen 2B Anthony Servideo SS Gunnar Henderson UT Joey Ortiz GCL 2B Darell Hernaiz 3B Coby Mayo SS Erison Placencia Plenty of playing time to go around in the short term, and long term I think we will be stacked at 3B but weak up the middle.
  13. I can definitely see the pitching being worse. Cashner is no longer around and looked like the league figured out Means later in the season. We received high quality starting pitching from those two for a good chunk of our starts, and it's very possible Bundy and/or Givens are traded before the season begins. Cobb, Kremer, Harvey, Akin, Lowther, etc. at least offer the possibility of optimism, but in all likelihood we are looking at our best innings in 2019 being replaced by 5.50 ERA level pitching (or worse) in 2020. It is not hard to be historically bad if the personnel fits the bill.
  14. This is a prime example of why I've never understood the MLBPA's adamant defense of amateur talent, both domestic and international. Yes, the majority of Major League players at one time signed an amateur contract with a team. There's also probably billions of dollars by now spent on prospects who burnt out without advancing far enough to ever join the MLBPA. Your multi-million dollar 18-year old who tops out at High-A is a lose-lose for both the players and the owners. It would be beneficial to both sides if there were overhauls to the amateur system to bring the top amateur signings down to that $275K range, with MAJOR concessions (such as relinquishing a club-controlled contract year or floating revenue-based minimum salary) to redirect those savings toward players who are actually current members of the MLBPA. The owners win in that their money spent is going toward quality instead of potential (and to a certain degree, Major League level spending probably increases attendance/merchandise revenues a lot more than amateur); the MLBPA wins by significantly increasing earnings for its actual members rather than people who might one day become a member ... as compared to the current system, where the amateurs and agents win even though they don't even have a seat at the negotiating table.
  15. If you don't believe Means will sustain his 2019 level of performance and there's a team out there willing to pay like he will, then you absolutely go for it. I'm not sure such a trading partner exists though. Three months ago, Means's trade value was pretty much in the gutter. Even if he ends up in the bullpen with us, he still probably brings more value from that role than what we'd get in return from a trade.
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