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08-05-2010 04:10 PM #16Plus Member Since 03/06 Hall of Fame
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- Sep 2003
I thought the 2006 "middle infielders draft" was a smart idea at the time. Who are your best HS position ballplayers-shortstops generally. We drafted a boatload. But none has panned out. Henson's an outfielder with a decent bat that won't cut it in left. Adams plays second and hits but couldn't catch a cold.Stephen...where's he (?) and Blake Davis pretty much bottomed out at triple A, apparently. Rowell was highly rated but isn't doing it.
I never knocked Jordan for this draft though.It just didn't pan out.
But I thought the 09 draft was a disaster on its face, starting w/Hobgood, and I still do.Most of that top ten aren't even healthy enough to go out on the field and fail.
08-05-2010 06:02 PM #17
08-05-2010 06:42 PM #18Plus Member Since 03/10
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- Sep 2008
I guess the problem comes back to a lot of the actual "prospects" we drafted in 09 are hurt. Next year, people's minds will start to change on that draft. Wirsch, Coffey, Webb are 3 guys I really like. Then Martin and Tim Berry are big time sleepers. Ryan Berry IMO is gonna be a mainstay in our rotation in a couple years. He doesn't have a ceiling equivalent to Berken at all IMO as some have said.....
Then, if both Henry and Tolliver can come back 100%, they will definitely take off. Even Hobgood, if he can regain that velocity by getting into better shape will be good. But Hobgood's velocity issue may or may not have to do with his conditioning. No one really knows until he gets into better shape, but if the velo never returns, then that will be the biggest waste of a #5 overall pick in a while IMO. Its not like Rowell where the entire scouting community was high on the kid, JJ put his neck on the line because he liked the package that came with Hobgood, but he wouldn't have made the pick had JJ known Hobby would be pitching in the high 80's, touching 91 on the occasion....
08-05-2010 07:17 PM #19
The thing I've noticed about Jordan's drafts is that seems to be targeting specific types of players. With hitters, he strongly favored those with good plate discipline (Hoes, Webb, Hoppy, Miclat), and with pitchers, he LOVES guys who can get GBs (Britton, Bergesen, Beal, Hobgood, Berry), and isn't afraid to go after guys who dropped due to non-career threatening injuries (Arrieta, Bundy, Coffey). This is a perfect implementation of the classic Moneyball theory, and we'll see if it pays off.
08-06-2010 12:47 AM #20Plus Member Since 03/10
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- Sep 2008
08-12-2011 12:45 PM #21
Jordan's approach to the draft and the orioles organization has not shown any consistancy or plan of what they want to do whihc is evidenced by the lack of ML prospects within their farm system. They are far from being a "Moneyball" or having a statistical based analysis plan applied to their drafts.
One of the reasons for the Orioles weak drafts and lack of talent in their farm system is that the HAVE NOT adopted any type of draft or player strategy such as evidenced in "Moneyball" and recently in the "The Extra 2%". If they were following similar methods they should have had a lot more success, especially when you consider their high draft slots. I sometimes think that you could draft better than the Orioles by reading Baseball America using that as your analysis.
08-13-2011 01:06 AM #22
You can't say "they haven't had success, therefore they don't have a strategy." They absolutely have a strategy, and it's very obvious if you look at the basic archetypes of the players they pick. Whether or not it has worked is another story.
Also, Moneyball is not about stats, it's about exploiting market inefficiencies. If the Orioles think they can get more value for less money by drafting groundball pitchers and disciplined hitters, then that is a Moneyball-type strategy. I'm not saying it has definitely worked, but you can't say they have no strategy.
08-13-2011 11:14 PM #23
08-13-2011 11:16 PM #24
08-15-2011 08:22 AM #25
The analysis of statistical data has increased and many of the young business oriented GM's use this information in many ways. Friedman in Tampa seeks players with great defensive statistics. If you look at his record it is validated by his ML/MiL talent and success in player development/acquistition.
I do not see any consistancy with the Orioles drafts which indicate they are after a player with specific traits based on their statistics. After several years of posessing a high draft position (13 going on 14??) this strategy should be quite obvious throughout their farm system without a lot of detailed analysis. Even with the normal attrition of drafted players, (injuries, did not sign, trades) their "plan" should be easily identified throughout their system because for the most part they have had their pick at the start of each draft round. It is quite hard to see any real consistancy which would serve to prove something is in place. Is "draft the arms buy the bats" a strategy for the draft?? If there was/is a plan then changes are required because the Orioles are not developing ML players equitable to their high draft position.
In regards to the O's please show me where they use statistical analysis in a proactive manner to acquire players with certain attributes the team desires? The Orioles need a young, hungry, and business trained GM and scouting director/department in order to compete. AM's day has come and gone and he no longer has the skills necessary to compete with these types of GM's and scouting directors. He has had several years to oversee the draft and the ML team with very poor results. I agree with you on one thing! A plan must be developed! The plan should be developed using statistical analysis and the Orioles need to hire someone who understands this approach and can follow it.
Last edited by baseball777; 08-15-2011 at 08:53 AM.
08-15-2011 01:08 PM #26
The thesis of Moneyball was not to show how the A's used statistical analysis. Moneyball's thesis was that to succeed in baseball with a lower payroll, a GM must be ahead of the curve in identifying market inefficiencies. Beane was ahead of the curve because he was one of the first GMs to appreciate the value of OBP. Since Moneyball's publication, the rest of baseball has advanced to the point where that is no longer ahead of the curve. That doesn't mean nobody can follow the Moneyball principle any more. Rather, it means that the Moneyball principle must be followed in ways that are not simplistic "look at their OBP"-type analyses.
The Orioles have done this to some extent. They appear to have identified a few types of players that might give them more value for less money. The most obvious of these are groundball pitchers, almost to the point where they will not even look at pitchers with straight fastballs. In this year's draft, Mike Wright and Kyle Simon were high round picks who are extreme groundball pitchers (Simon particularly), and Trent Howard who has fairly heavy GB tendencies himself. Last year, they gave a big overslot deal to Parker Bridwell, and took Matt Bywater and Dixon Anderson (who didn't sign) in the top ten as well.
I've seen and talked to just about every pitcher from the 2011 draft class. All but one that I've seen throw at least two fastball variations and most primarily throw two-seams. The same thing holds true for the guys I've talked to from the 2009 class (Hobgood, Wirsch, Berry, Cowan). The Orioles are undeniably targeting specific types of pitchers, regardless of whether you can see it on their BR pages.
I'm not saying that they've been super successful. The fact that I saw five of the top ten picks in the 09 class at short-season A ball speaks to that. I agree that if MacPhail isn't willing to do more to bring talent into the system then he should be replaced. I don't know if Jordan is onto something with his strategies, but I can see that they are there and he does have a coherent plan, unlike many in the organization.
08-15-2011 02:20 PM #27
That is WHY Moneyball and its approach was successful to a team like the A's who had limited budget/resources/payroll. I will agree with you that the Moneyball approach allowed the A's to be competative against t eams with larger budgets but the basis of it all was that Beane went against conventional wisdom and used statistics to allow himself to identify players that would allow him to compete.
If you read "The Extra 2%" the Rays stressed defense as one of the statistical attributes of players that they could acquire cheaply as they also had limited resources.
As for the Orioles, there still is no evidence and success to prove that they have any plan at the moment.
Synopsis of Moneyball
Moneyball: The Art of Winning an Unfair Game (ISBN 0-393-05765-8) is a book by Michael Lewis, published in 2003, about the Oakland Athletics baseball team and its general manager Billy Beane. Its focus is the team's modernized, analytical, sabermetric approach to assembling a competitive baseball team, despite Oakland's disadvantaged revenue situation. A film based on the book is set to come out in 2011.
The central premise of Moneyball is that the collected wisdom of baseball insiders (including players, managers, coaches, scouts, and the front office) over the past century is subjective and often flawed. Statistics such as stolen bases, runs batted in, and batting average, typically used to gauge players, are relics of a 19th century view of the game and the statistics that were available at the time. The book argues that the Oakland A's' front office took advantage of more empirical gauges of player performance to field a team that could compete successfully against richer competitors in Major League Baseball.
Rigorous statistical analysis had demonstrated that on-base percentage and slugging percentage are better indicators of offensive success, and the A's became convinced that these qualities were cheaper to obtain on the open market than more historically valued qualities such as speed and contact. These observations often flew in the face of conventional baseball wisdom and the beliefs of many baseball scouts and executives
Billy Beane, general manager of MLB's Oakland A's and protagonist of Michael Lewis's Moneyball, had a problem: how to win in the Major Leagues with a budget that's smaller than that of nearly every other team. Conventional wisdom long held that big name, highly athletic hitters and young pitchers with rocket arms were the ticket to success. But Beane and his staff, buoyed by massive amounts of carefully interpreted statistical data, believed that wins could be had by more affordable methods such as hitters with high on-base percentage and pitchers who get lots of ground outs. Given this information and a tight budget, Beane defied tradition and his own scouting department to build winning teams of young affordable players and inexpensive castoff veterans.
Last edited by baseball777; 08-15-2011 at 02:24 PM.
08-15-2011 02:37 PM #28
777, you are entirely missing the point. Everybody used statistics in evaluating players in the 60's and 70's and everyone uses them today. The difference that Beane introduced was to use statistics to identify skills that were undervalued in the market place and target players with those skills. Heck, Syd Thrift would quote you plenty of statistics, that wasn't the point. Beane's use of statistics allowed him to find players that could contibute to a team's success, while not costing the team a ton of money to acquire them. Statistics are meaningless unless you use them in a way that gains a competitive advantage over the other teams in the league.
08-15-2011 02:57 PM #29
Did you even read what you quoted?
"But Beane and his staff, buoyed by massive amounts of carefully interpreted statistical data, believed that wins could be had by more affordable methods such as hitters with high on-base percentage and pitchers who get lots of ground outs."
"on-base percentage and slugging percentage are better indicators of offensive success, and the A's became convinced that these qualities were cheaper to obtain on the open market"
Moneyball is about how the A's got more wins for less money. The Orioles are trying to do the same in the draft. Rather than overpaying for the Chris Tillmans of the world, they're paying less money for the Zach Brittons.
08-15-2011 03:04 PM #30
As a RESULT of his application of once useless or ignored statistics he was able to produce a competative team, and to agree with you, under a limited budget. Without this method there would have been NO Moneyball. The book heavily concentrates on both Beane, his intelligence, non-conventional approach, and his use of statistics which were a means to be competative with his budget. The part of the book that most people miss is that Beane didn't pick his players just because they were the only ones he could afford; they really were the guys he wanted most, and most of them weren't even on the radar for other teams.
Budget was an underlying factor but the book was about the man and his revolutionary use of statistics to build a team.
Probably the best chapter in the book, to me at least, was the one about Bill James and the birth of sabremetrics. It was included because it was the basis for the entire strategy and the reason for writing the book.