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spiritof66 last won the day on June 22 2017

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About spiritof66

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    Advanced Member
  • Birthday 10/30/1951

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    New York City
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  • Interests
    Reading, music (drums, guitar), baseball history, college basketball
  • Occupation
    Retired lawyer
  • Favorite Current Oriole
    I dunno. Who's left? Mancini?
  • Favorite All Time Oriole

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  1. It depends on what you mean by "go after."
  2. I agree with most of this, but there's also a question as to how much value can be gotten out of the guys on this list, whether that value is realized via trade or sticking around when the Orioles are a much better team. (For those purposes, I would add Alberto to the list.) Who on this list might in a couple of years hold down a job in MLB other than filling a roster spot on a real bad team? Means and Santander have a good chance, IMO. The rest seem unlikely, but you never know. I never know, anyhow.
  3. Thanks for posting this. Earlier this year, as part of a project that has gotten sidetracked, I did an analysis of the 2018 Forbes numbers. I'm not at home and don’t have access to that stuff right now, but from memory I pretty much did Frobby did, with a few differences noted below. While working with the Forbes numbers, I concluded, I guess based on what I can remember from my extensive work with business valuations years ago, that it's more meaningful to look at the average of a team's multi-year numbers than to focus on a single year. That should create a more meaningful picture of things by reducing the effect of single-year aberrations -- maybe important and maybe not, depending on what you're looking for. However, that conclusion, combined with my antiquated and awkward relationship with spreadsheets, slowed me down quite a bit. Forbes has been presenting these annual MLB valuations for over 20 years. I have been following the Forbes numbers, and reading about them, for the past six or seven years, and I am confident that they have been pretty accurate in recent years -- maybe not precise, but close enough for use when you’re looking for patterns and making comparisons. The big exception is that, as Frobby (and Forbes) point out, Forbes ignores the revenues some teams derive from owning all or part of the regional sports networks that pay them rights fees to carry their games. (That omission tends overall to reduce the relative revenues and profits of larger-city, higher-revenue franchises.) We know from the MASN case that MLB permits team-owned RSNs to divert a portion of the value of teams' rights fees to the RSNs. I’m surprised that Forbes hasn’t by now made team-by-team estimates of annual revenues from ownership of RSNs where that’s applicable. Maybe next year. In any event, instead of ignoring this revenue source, a couple of years ago I made crude (and conservative) estimates of teams’ revenues from their RSN ownership, and added that estimate to the revenues for each team that owns an RSN. I have no illusion that those guesses are accurate, but I suspect they’re more accurate than the zero that Forbes and Frobby use. The other difference between my methodology and Frobby’s is that I used player payroll numbers from a different source, I think Spotrac. I can’t remember why. I agree with Frobby that there are lots of things you can do with these numbers, and I only scratched the surface. A few general observations for now, though. In my opinion, while the ability of an MLB team to compete successfully depends on a number of factors, the two most important are (a) its potential to generate revenues when it is well managed, and (b) the potential of its divisional rivals to generate revenues. Estimating a team’s potential revenues is complicated, but the Forbes numbers provide a way to move toward a reasonable approximation: take the average revenues (plus an approximation of revenues from RSNs) over the past X seasons (five seems like a reasonable number) and weight the more recent years. That doesn’t work very well in at least two types of situations: teams whose revenues have been depressed in some years because of poor management (the Mets, Marlins and possibly the Orioles are examples), and teams that chose to allow their revenues -- and their costs – to be reduced in some years as part of a rebuilding process. Those teams' historical revenues need to be adjusted when you compare them to other teams', and I haven’t figured out how to do that. I have posted in the past some interesting (to me, anyway) numbers that the Forbes figures make readily accessible: the average price of each ticket sold (a team’s gate receipts, per Forbes) divided by that team’s home attendance for the same year. Teams in areas with relatively large populations, high wealth, and lots of corporate headquarters and a concentration of service (financial, law, consulting and accounting) firms get more per ticket -- a lot more in some areas. Though I haven’t studied it, it's my belief that, while a team's paid attendance rises and falls based on the team’s on-field success (with a time lag), its average ticket price for a given year is affected only slightly by recent on-field performance. If that’s so, then a team’s average ticket prices over, say, 10 years should reflect primarily factors that it can’t easily change: the demographics (including population, wealth, baseball tradition, competition for entertainment/recreation from other teams and activities) of its city and the surrounding area, and (especially in two-team cities) the location and appeal of its stadium and the nature of its fan base. That is, a team's average price per paid patron should correspond closely to its potential ability to generate revenues.That’s something I hope to look at after a lot more thought. I’ll try to get back to these numbers after the first of the year and post some additional observations. But, as I said, I'm pretty slow with spreadsheeting stuff. Thanks again, Frobby.
  4. Having him pitch to Sisco might provide a distraction, for a few minutes, from how bad this team will be? Really, what are the Chances? 😉
  5. https://www.totalprosports.com/2019/11/13/more-footage-seemingly-shows-astros-cheating-in-2019-by-banging-on-trash-cans-video/
  6. Peter Angelos originally owned about 60 percent. Within a couple of years after Tom Clancy's death in 2013, I tried to figure out what Angelos's interest was. Based on a few pieces of information, which I can't now remember, I estimated it was around 80 percent. We're not supposed to know who owns what.
  7. Orix finished sixth and last in the Pacific League last year, but did lead all of NPB with 7 ties. (Makes me think there may be a few rule differences.) http://npb.jp/bis/eng/2019/standings/ It would be interesting for the Orioles and Buffs to swap teams for this season.
  8. Like it's not going to be a strike, apparently.
  9. He'll have to cut down on that leg kick to get to an acceptable TTTP. Gonna need a SS and 2B. Maybe one of the minor league managers has kids who are ready. Even if the SS seems too tall for the position and the 2Bman has an annoying habit of writing things on the knob of his bat, give them a shot now that Villar is gone.
  10. Kan ye come up with any more of these?
  11. I enjoyed watching Bundy pitch, but found myself spending a lot of time on the edge of my seat (figuratively) awaiting those inevitable long HRs.
  12. I'm glad I left out the part about the BJs having assembled a nice core and being well positioned to buy some high-priced free agents in na couple years if that's what they need to build a contender.
  13. I think that's unrealistic, unless the structure of player acquisition, retention and compensation is altered significantly in a way that levels the competition among teams with different levels of resources, or the divisions are re-aligned, or the Orioles are acquired by an ownership group that is willing to lose lots of money. (I guess a fourth possibility is that the NYYs or Red Sox, or both, will field bad teams over long stretches, but that seems very unlikely to me.) Otherwise, the teams that compete with teams that have significantly higher revenues (the Orioles, Jays and Rays in the NL East, the Reds, Pirates and Brewers in the NL Central, and the Pads, Rox and D-Backs in the NL West) are not going to contend on a consistent basis. If they make good decisions and have some luck, any of them might have a run of, optimistically, six to eight years of quality teams that are in contention most of those years, and that stretch can include some post-season play and success. That's what I'm hoping for. On the other hand, going through a total Astros-style rebuild doesn't assure any success, or that the Orioles will play a post-season game while Elias and the prospects now in the MiL or brought in over the next couple of years are still around.
  14. For me, deeper or higher fences, leading to fewer HRs and, probably, more XBHs, would make watching games more enjoyable. I don't see how moving towards a neutral (in terms of HRs and run production) could be counted on to help the team, though. It makes more sense to build a team that suits the park than to fiddle around with the fences to try to improve the team's performance. I say that notwithstanding Charlie Finley's failure with a bring-in-the-RF-fence and then add lefty sluggers strategy in Kansas City, which led to the JIm Gentile-for-Norm Sieburn trade with the Orioles. https://tht.fangraphs.com/the-pennant-porch-pie-in-the-face/
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