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About jsbearr

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  • Birthday 9/7/1979

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  1. That is not the point I was trying to express. The point is that a coach or an analyst should be able to express anything he knows in an applied sense that can easily be understood by a little league kid. The goal is about being able to convey a message that cannot be misinterpreted. In other words, your goal is not to be understandable. Your goal is to be beyond understandable.
  2. My experience is that if you have trouble explaining things to someone with an equivalent 6th grade competency that you will not be doing much analysis work. So many folks want these positions that you often can insist on basic communication competency. It is fairly common for an advanced analytics group to send their analysts out to their minor league programs. The minor leaguers need to be more involved and analysts cut their teeth better at the level, it seems. Everything is flattening and moving away from a heavily controlled silo design. I imagine many teams still worry, but that is where things have moved.
  3. Yes and no. Your better constructed franchises directly incorporate their data analysts into the day-to-day activities. Coaches certainly provide a construct within the clubhouse, but they also can rely on those analysts to be able to directly interact with them and their players. Those analysts need to be able to communicate to everyone what they are doing and everyone needs to ensure they are all on the same page for that player's objectives. For the manager to act as the conduit would really hamper the manager in what his duties are and makes him an agent for data utilization in a way that probably underserves that analytical process.
  4. Running through the heat maps, the difference I primarily see is that Martin is often a step or two closer than several of the other SSs on non-shift plays, but basically were the other SSs are on shifts. That, I doubt, would explain such an atrocious number if he was plus out there.
  5. The issue with positioning has been known for a decade, first as stadium specific issues with outfield fences and then with shifting. Statcast negates a lot of that and the primary reason why MLB has not provided statistics for that is simply that it is a small team trying to do a large number of things and do them well. It should also be noted that it is in Sig's position to obscure negative aspects by stating kernels of truth. With available data, you can triangulate some things. We know that Astros, Dodgers, Orioles, Twins, Brewers, Rays, Marlins, DBacks, Yankees, and Pirates all shift >33% of the time in their infield. Where do their SS line up with something like UZR/150? Rojas (MIA) 17.2 Ahmed (AZ) 8.7 Adames (TB) 4.4 Correa (HOU) 0.8 Arcia (MIL) -4.2 Torres (NYY) -4.9 Seager (LAD) -7.2 Newman (PIT) -7.4 Polanco (MIN) -9.8 Martin (BAL) -16.9 When you look at these ten teams, you get a slightly negative skew by two runs or so. It should also be noted that the Astros, Dodgers, and Orioles shift over 45% of the time. While the older metrics have flaws, they generally will point you in the right direction and I do not exactly think positioning explains things unless the Orioles are utilizing a positioning scheme incredibly different and unique than other teams who shift a great deal. Edit: Correct to >33% from <33%
  6. I cannot get into specifics and this involves another team, but there was a situation like Cashner's where the pitcher was doing well enough to be useful, but that the pitcher was such an ill fit as a team leader (where he excelled before as a second or third in clubhouse command) that the team dealt him out. The feeling was that the savings in money and the pieces in return would be worth more to the success of the club than having a guy around who insisted on inserting himself in situations where he was not competent to handle a leadership role. The pitcher was undermining the community of the clubhouse and that was more important in that instance than his all star level performance in the field. Cashner was not as good as that pitcher, but you hear some similar things between that guy and Cashner so maybe the general thought was that they would get a couple upside guys while eliminating someone who was perceived as a mild hindrance to what they wanted the clubhouse to be.
  7. Both jive with what I heard. If you connected with his personality, then he could be helpful. However, his style was his style and he was not going to compromise how he choose to communicate himself. He also would interject himself into situations where past experience illustrated that he was a poor messenger in those moments particularly because he refused to adapt to different people. Some considered him a bit hypercompetitive in some situations, which can be a boon but also get in the way. In other words, if you were looking for a team leader then you would keep on looking, but if a guy could relate to him and he would stay out of situations he could not provide something positive then he is a good fit. As a veteran leader, he is a good fit as the third or fourth banana where others higher on the chain could push him out of situations where he really is not suited for.
  8. It could have been anyone. Palmer's criticisms in the past have been seen within the organization as being not constructive and inflammatory. Maybe this is inaccurate, but it has been expressed to me that in the rare instances that he does talk to a pitcher that his advice is never something that can actually be applied. That it is stuck in what worked in a previous era. So, all that happens is that it is unhelpful and encourages fans to make bad situations worse.
  9. Jim Palmer was very good and looked great because of a superior defense and some help from Memorial Stadium. In other words, he is a HOF pitcher who looked like a very special HoF pitcher.
  10. None of it is meaningless. A quick run down. ERA expresses that a pitcher is responsible for all runs except those caused in relationship to errors. FIP expresses that a pitcher is responsible for Ks, BBs, and batted balls that go over the fence. It tries to isolate the pitcher from good or bad fielding which could make him look better or worse than he actually is. xFIP takes FIP, but suggests there is randomness to home runs and instead assigns league average values for that by considering the pitcher's fly ball rate. SIERA says that relationships between strikeouts and balls to runs are not linear. It uses more complicated math to develop that association. It also treats batted balls as far more complicated with a focus on ground balls. DRA thinks all of that is nice, but that run attribution is very complex. It uses mixed modeling to determine that. It breaks down pitcher performance pitch by pitch. It looks at the field, the weather, the specific batter, the catcher, the umpire. It puts these all together and develops a larger picture. In general, all of the metrics will lead you to a similar place unless over a career a pitch pitches in front of an incredible defense (see: Jim Palmer) or if they reside in an extreme offensive environment. If I remember correctly, ERA takes about 100 IP to have a decent sample. FIP is also around 100. xFIP is around 80. SIERA is around 60. DRA is around 30. You have to basically quadruple those samples if you want something fairly definitive, but those marks give you a reasonable idea who the pitcher is. The key thing to remember is that ERA gives way too much credit to the pitcher for batted balls. FIP gives way too much credit to the defense for batted balls. xFIP does a shade better. SIERA tries to parse out major drivers of pitching performance. DRA tries to solve the whole thing.
  11. He looks more like a 1/10 w/option or a 2/18 player. A weak pitching team may be desperate enough to offer that. A team like Boston is looking at him as a short term fifth starter and then pushing him back in the bullpen. That is the kind of player whose option will not get picked up and indicates a pitcher that is not well viewed in baseball (which has been the case for several years now once his high velocity profile went away). Some team in dire need of SP (like the Orioles were when they signed him) will be willing to hand out a deal in the 8-10 million range, but only on a short term deal. Most teams will not see him as a viable starter better than their 5th or 6th options. Sometimes the numbers are helpful, sometimes they make you think Gerardo Parra will be a good pickup. That is why it is good to look at the context of the numbers.
  12. It will be fun to revisit this thread when Cashner signs a free agent deal this offseason.
  13. Word rumbling from the Astros is that Reed is resistant to change and not exactly a great presence with respect to coaching and developmental staff. Baseball is hard and it is amazing when you can even sniff AAA, so it can be very difficult for an intensely dedicated player to throw away aspects that led to everything that got them there. Some players can do it, but that have to get low and experience something shaking enough to change lanes. Few ever do that. Most just go on doing the same thing over and over again because it once worked incredibly well. To put it a different way, it took Justin Turner about 200 supervised hours to reprogram his swing. Few players who once experienced great success are willing to suffer through months of awkwardness that certainly does not promise a better future.
  14. I think the inability of the Astros developmental techniques to increase Reed's batspeed will probably inform Elias' decision. I would be mildly surprised if the Orioles grabbed him. I am not sure what one could do with him.
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