What are the Chances?

[Tony-OH]

I guess it's relative. Does Coffey have a higher ceiling than the slot pick at 15th round or higher? Sure. But I lose any useful feel for the term "higher ceiling" when it isn't put into context.

I guess I'll just leave it at BAL could spend above-slot in every round and still end up with the worst draft class in the AL East. I think the constant pointing to draft spend is a bit limited in its usefulness, and potentially misleading to the casual fan. But I understand that is a minority view, so I'm happy to butt out of the convo. I'm honestly tired of being the wet blanket in the 2010 draft convos, particularly since I liked a fair number of the picks.

It's likely the distinctions I'm trying to make simply aren't particularly interesting to those who want to discuss the positives of BAL's draft approach. I'm content to leave it at that.

I'm not sure I understand. Coffey flashed mid-90s heat, he's 6-foot-5 and left-handed. That's a high ceiling guy for me. Does he have a ton of obstacles, sure, but that does not lessen his ceiling.

I agree that spending overslot does not always work out, in fact, I'll go a step further and suggest that most of these over-slot guys won't work out. But, the difference in my mind is ceiling.

Let's look at Justin Dalles. He's a sixth round pick. What's his ceiling? Probably if everything works out he's probably a backup catcher. Now, let's look at Jarrett Martin. Left-hander who has shown three-plus pitches at times in is career. What's his ceiling? Well, if he can command is stuff more consistently, stay healthy, prove he can get into the 6th/7th inning while maintaining his stuff, his ceiling is a major league starter.

Now, what are the chances that everything works out perfectly for Martin? Not good at all of course, but that doesn't take away from his ceiling.

The only thing I'm saying is when you analyze the talent the Orioles signed this year, there are many more guys with high ceilings than in year's past when by the 7th round they were drafting guys who's ceiling made them a situational lefty. Whether this strategy works out or whether the Orioles choose the right guys remains to be seen.

[Lucky Jim]

I guess it's relative. Does Coffey have a higher ceiling than the slot pick at 15th round or higher? Sure. But I lose any useful feel for the term "higher ceiling" when it isn't put into context.

I guess I'll just leave it at BAL could spend above-slot in every round and still end up with the worst draft class in the AL East. I think the constant pointing to draft spend is a bit limited in its usefulness, and potentially misleading to the casual fan. But I understand that is a minority view, so I'm happy to butt out of the convo. I'm honestly tired of being the wet blanket in the 2010 draft convos, particularly since I liked a fair number of the picks.

It's likely the distinctions I'm trying to make simply aren't particularly interesting to those who want to discuss the positives of BAL's draft approach. I'm content to leave it at that.

I agree that folks sometimes overvalue prospects, and that fringe-y rumors and signing bonuses are big factors in that. That said, I think it's pretty clear that the risk profile of this draft is unorthodox, and thus soliciting the orthodoxy to tell us whether it was rightly implemented is inherently problematic.

Because the strategy is unorthodox, and the empirical data about prospect risk somewhat shaky, I don't think we're likely to know much about this draft for two years or so.

I said as it played out that I didn't like the strategy much (at first blush) even though I liked the outlays. And I still think that, to an extent. But I also know that trying relatively new things has some inherent value in it. Some years may call for a slightly unorthodox approach. Feels a little bit like the O's took a hedge fund approach this year, when the orthodoxy is to take a mutual fund approach.

Could fail. If it doesn't, kudos.

[Stotle]

I agree that folks sometimes overvalue prospects, and that fringe-y rumors and signing bonuses are big factors in that. That said, I think it's pretty clear that the risk profile of this draft is unorthodox, and thus soliciting the orthodoxy to tell us whether it was rightly implemented is inherently problematic.

Because the strategy is unorthodox, and the empirical data about prospect risk somewhat shaky, I don't think we're likely to know much about this draft for two years or so.

I said as it played out that I didn't like the strategy much (at first blush) even though I liked the outlays. And I still think that, to an extent. But I also know that trying relatively new things has some inherent value in it. Some years may call for a slightly unorthodox approach. Feels a little bit like the O's took a hedge fund approach this year, when the orthodoxy is to take a mutual fund approach.

Could fail. If it doesn't, kudos.

I don't think there is anything controversial here, but I disagree with your first paragraph. We aren't asking for the 29 other teams to determine whether or not BAL's strategy was sound. I'm asking for opinions to put into context the extent to which BAL is out on a limb with the stategy and with particular picks. I think it's less than some think and more than others think. The industry's views of particular players and bonuses would absolutely help put into context to what extent BAL made strategic moves, and to what extent (if any) BAL may have been reaching a bit too far.

It just seems to me that the discussion is often framed in too simple a manner to yield anything that could be used to weigh the pros and cons of this approach.

[LookinUp]

This thread can only be answered beyond the standard platitudes by people who really not only understand the ceiling and likelihood of reaching that ceiling of the prospects that we drafted and signed, but also understand the alternatives and the tradeoffs.

There are so many names and stats, but only evaluators understand the comparable talent, and only FO execs understand all of the considerations made when drafting one player over another.

It's a neat academic exercise to discuss, but I can think of any number of college papers that are written based on a far less than perfect understanding of the problem at hand.

So, understanding that I am one of those folks who simply doesn't understand this stuff, I'll simply fall back on the two things that I've considered important so far:

1. The current regime seems to have a knack for finding and developing pitching.

2. The current regime seems not to have a knack (at least much less so) for finding and developing hitting.

So, I like what I've heard about the pitching that we drafted and I'm optimistic that several of those guys will develop well. I don't love much at all about the hitting that we drafted, and I'm not very confident about what they will become.

Time will tell.

[Lucky Jim]

I don't think there is anything controversial here, but I disagree with your first paragraph. We aren't asking for the 29 other teams to determine whether or not BAL's strategy was sound. I'm asking for opinions to put into context the extent to which BAL is out on a limb with the stategy and with particular picks. I think it's less than some think and more than others think. The industry's views of particular players and bonuses would absolutely help put into context to what extent BAL made strategic moves, and to what extent (if any) BAL may have been reaching a bit too far.

It just seems to me that the discussion is often framed in too simple a manner to yield anything that could be used to weigh the pros and cons of this approach.

I guess I just find that the risk profile of the player influences the valuation. And that if you are actively pursuing high-ceiling risk, and have a strategy in place to actively pursue that risk, it would seem to have some bearing on an individual valuation. I might pay $150,000 more for a certain type of investment w/ off-putting risk if I've got a strategy built around that risk. For instance, injury.* I'm no expert in that kind of thing, of course.

This thread can only be answered beyond the standard platitudes by people who really not only understand the ceiling and likelihood of reaching that ceiling of the prospects that we drafted and signed, but also understand the alternatives and the tradeoffs.

There are so many names and stats, but only evaluators understand the comparable talent, and only FO execs understand all of the considerations made when drafting one player over another.

It's a neat academic exercise to discuss, but I can think of any number of college papers that are written based on a far less than perfect understanding of the problem at hand.

So, understanding that I am one of those folks who simply doesn't understand this stuff, I'll simply fall back on the two things that I've considered important so far:

1. The current regime seems to have a knack for finding and developing pitching.

2. The current regime seems not to have a knack (at least much less so) for finding and developing hitting.

So, I like what I've heard about the pitching that we drafted and I'm optimistic that several of those guys will develop well. I don't love much at all about the hitting that we drafted, and I'm not very confident about what they will become.

Time will tell.

I think this is right, for the most part.

*I acknowledge that this approach requires some undervaluation on the part of everyone else to make any sense. In this case, I guess, rate of return from injury.

[Stotle]

I guess I just find that the risk profile of the player influences the valuation. And that if you are actively pursuing high-ceiling risk, and have a strategy in place to actively pursue that risk, it would seem to have some bearing on an individual valuation. I might pay $150,000 more for a certain type of investment w/ off-putting risk if I've got a strategy built around that risk. For instance, injury. I'm no expert in that kind of thing, of course.

I think this somewhat mischaracterizes draft strategies on the whole, but could be wrong. Regarding your edit -- I think the having the thoughts of other industry evaluators would speak pretty well to this.

[Arthur_Bryant]

Finally, again worth noting that a huge chunk of analysis is missing by simply saying "Money spent = good potential talent." The draft offers almost infinite opportunity to mispend money. Simply writing a check doesn't guarantee high ceiling talent, let alone quality talent.

You were kind enough not to name me, but I plead guilty anyway. No doubt, a team with a really good personnel staff will have a much better chance of hitting big with its draft investment. And it is possible to make some very expensive mistakes.

My thinking on this does assume a reasonably competent scouting staff. But I don't believe that a team has to be extremely good to make out very well in the draft over time. I think the odds of this game favor aggressiveness.

Consider the value of just a moderately successful young MLB player, pre-arb--say, a pitcher who manages to be worth 6 WAR in his first three seasons. Even after his salary and various development costs, he has more than returned the entire draft bonus outlay for two years @$10MM/yr, while becoming an asset that can bring back talent in a trade. Everything else that comes out of those two drafts is profit, in terms of win value.

Under those circumstances, with just a reasonably competent scouting department, a perennially aggressive draft-and-sign strategy stands an excellent chance of more than paying for itself over time, so that the money spent on draft bonuses becomes not so much an expense as simply a deferral of payoff. Individual seasons might sometimes fail to pay for themselves, but over time aggressiveness will be rewarded, unless a team is really bad at scouting and projection, or very unlucky.

BTW I love the O's approach this year of diversifying risk by spreading the bonus money among half a dozen or more overslot picks. Yes I would have preferred to see some of that money go to Myers and/or Stassi, but overall the odds are with the O's, I think.

[Stotle]

You were kind enough not to name me, but I plead guilty anyway. No doubt, a team with a really good personnel staff will have a much better chance of hitting big with its draft investment. And it is possible to make some very expensive mistakes.

My thinking on this does assume a reasonably competent scouting staff. But I don't believe that a team has to be extremely good to make out very well in the draft over time. I think the odds of this game favor aggressiveness.

Consider the value of just a moderately successful young MLB player, pre-arb--say, a pitcher who manages to be worth 6 WAR in his first three seasons. Even after his salary and various development costs, he has more than returned the entire draft bonus outlay for two years @$10MM/yr, while becoming an asset that can bring back talent in a trade. Everything else that comes out of those two drafts is profit, in terms of win value.

Under those circumstances, with just a reasonably competent scouting department, a perennially aggressive draft-and-sign strategy stands an excellent chance of more than paying for itself over time, so that the money spent on draft bonuses becomes not so much an expense as simply a deferral of payoff. Individual seasons might sometimes fail to pay for themselves, but over time aggressiveness will be rewarded, unless a team is really bad at scouting and projection, or very unlucky.

BTW I love the O's approach this year of diversifying risk by spreading the bonus money among half a dozen or more overslot picks. Yes I would have preferred to see some of that money go to Myers and/or Stassi, but overall the odds are with the O's, I think.

THis is a very good post that I don't have time to respond to, but will. I think you touch on a lot of issues worth kicking around.

Oh, and I really wasn't thinking of you, or anyone, in particular with the post you quoted. I think that as a rough sketch it generally works out that higher bonuses indicate a higher talent being signed. I just think if the board really wants to have an honest discussion about a "change in strategy" and the potential benefits, there are enough intelligent posters for everyone to roll-up their sleeves and do a little more heavy lifting. Too many well-read posters slapping round designations based on bonuses to do any discussion any good.

[Three Run Homer]

The O's drafted a lot of interesting players, but in the long run the draft is going to be judged mostly based on how well Hobgood pans out. We had the number four pick in the entire draft, and I'm sure lots of guys taken after him will wind up having good careers. Hobgood was not the guy that most of the so-called experts would have chosen. If Hobgood Isgood, then the draft will be a feather in Jordan's cap; otherwise, it will be seen as a blown chance.

[Arthur_Bryant]

The O's drafted a lot of interesting players, but in the long run the draft is going to be judged mostly based on how well Hobgood pans out. We had the number four pick in the entire draft, and I'm sure lots of guys taken after him will wind up having good careers. Hobgood was not the guy that most of the so-called experts would have chosen. If Hobgood Isgood, then the draft will be a feather in Jordan's cap; otherwise, it will be seen as a blown chance.

Hobgood can't be considered apart from the draft as a whole, unless you feel that the O's had a virtually unlimited budget for the draft. If they had instead drafted Matzek (for example) they wouldn't have had the money for the multiple overslot picks later on.

I wish the budget were flexible and large enough to allow going far overslot in the first round and as often as possible in later rounds. But that isn't the case, so every potential first-round pick is essentially a package with the overslot picks in later rounds. In the case of Matzek or Wheeler, that package is considerably smaller than the package of Hobgood and the bunch of overslots that followed him.

So playing the what-if game is problematic at best. You can't just take out Hobgood and substitute Matzek or Wheeler. You need to know who would not have been drafted in order to preserve enough of the budget to sign those guys.

Furthermore, Hobgood isn't the only high-ceiling guy in this draft class. Trust me, if Hobgood busts, but Wirsch and Coffey hit their ceilings... (or Coffey and Berry... or Wirsch and Ohlman... you get the picture) then nobody is going to care that Jordan booted the #4 pick in the entire draft.

And that's the way it should be, because it's certain that some of those guys would have gone elsewhere if Hobgood hadn't been the first-round pick.

[Lucky Jim]

I'm really interested in the difference in discounting between injury and projection. I don't know enough about either, but I'm intrigued at the possibility that it might be easier to predict a bounceback from injury than to project the correction of a performance flaw, and whether or not the Orioles strategy in this draft involves that a bit.

Just spit-balling.

[Stotle]

I'm really interested in the difference in discounting between injury and projection. I don't know enough about either, but I'm intrigued at the possibility that it might be easier to predict a bounceback from injury than to project the correction of a performance flaw, and whether or not the Orioles strategy in this draft involves that a bit.

Just spit-balling.

I think the challenge you are faced with is that projecting from injury, as well as projecting from a performance blip, are necessarily only effective on a case-by-case basis.

For example, Jameson Taillon is widely considered the best high school arm in this draft class. Were he to injure his elbow in Ft. Myers first week of January, and undergo TJ surgery, it would be a much different analysis than what I'd apply to, say, Kevin Ziomek.

Taillon, while a little herky-jerky in spots, has a cleaner arm action, bigger body and has shown terrific stuff dating back to the start of the summer.

Ziomek has some timing issues, is a little slighter, a more questionable arm action and has seen his stock rise recently after his performance down in Jupiter in October.

Now, compare that to some like Karsten Whitson, who is widely discussed as one of the top five high school arms in the class and has shown consistent stuff throughout the summer/fall. Let's suppose his stuff regresses this spring and at the time of the draft he's a upper-80s to low-90s guy, rather than low- to mid-90s.

Compare again to Ziomek, who is now regressing rather than injured.

There just isn't any easy way to say the injured group or the regression group is the better bet to rebound. How do I know whether or not Ziomek's rise as the summer progressed will show up again when he rehabs? If Taillon rehabs, I'm at least comfortable that the durable build and pre-injury stuff was good enough to allow for some regression in stuff.

Further, perhaps the regression group (Whitson/Ziomek) struggled for reasons I think I've identified. I'm less troubled by the regression, in that case, because I think I can fix it. However, I'm much more comfortable with Whitson, since I've seen him sustain his stuff over a longer period of time. I'm confident that when everything clicks, the "good" Whitson is the true Whitson.

I think it's an interesting thought -- hope I'm adding to it some. Am I overlooking anything? Underplaying/overplaying hurdles?

[Lucky Jim]

I think the challenge you are faced with is that projecting from injury, as well as projecting from a performance blip, are necessarily only effective on a case-by-case basis.

For example, Jameson Taillon is widely considered the best high school arm in this draft class. Were he to injure his elbow in Ft. Myers first week of January, and undergo TJ surgery, it would be a much different analysis than what I'd apply to, say, Kevin Ziomek.

Taillon, while a little herky-jerky in spots, has a cleaner arm action, bigger body and has shown terrific stuff dating back to the start of the summer.

Ziomek has some timing issues, is a little slighter, a more questionable arm action and has seen his stock rise recently after his performance down in Jupiter in October.

Now, compare that to some like Karsten Whitson, who is widely discussed as one of the top five high school arms in the class and has shown consistent stuff throughout the summer/fall. Let's suppose his stuff regresses this spring and at the time of the draft he's a upper-80s to low-90s guy, rather than low- to mid-90s.

Compare again to Ziomek, who is now regressing rather than injured.

There just isn't any easy way to say the injured group or the regression group is the better bet to rebound. How do I know whether or not Ziomek's rise as the summer progressed will show up again when he rehabs? If Taillon rehabs, I'm at least comfortable that the durable build and pre-injury stuff was good enough to allow for some regression in stuff.

Further, perhaps the regression group (Whitson/Ziomek) struggled for reasons I think I've identified. I'm less troubled by the regression, in that case, because I think I can fix it. However, I'm much more comfortable with Whitson, since I've seen him sustain his stuff over a longer period of time. I'm confident that when everything clicks, the "good" Whitson is the true Whitson.

I think it's an interesting thought -- hope I'm adding to it some. Am I overlooking anything? Underplaying/overplaying hurdles?

Good stuff. I think all of this is relevant. To be clear, I'm not trying to offer any kind of single-minded approach, and I think the details you provide show why a single-minded approach would be foolish.

[Stotle]

Good stuff. I think all of this is relevant. To be clear, I'm not trying to offer any kind of single-minded approach, and I think the details you provide show why a single-minded approach would be foolish.

Yeah, I tried to be general with the post, but it gets so much more complicated. It isn't uncommon for healthy HSers to fluctuate with their stuff. Having someone do a 180 and perform poorly for a season isn't generally good news. Injury in a young arm has to be assessed in the context of mechanics, body type and stuff, as well as work ethic (for recovery) and even how much growing the body has left to do.

It's a complicated question -- is it more daunting, generally, to project from injury or poor performance?

[LookinUp]

Trust me, if Hobgood busts, but Wirsch and Coffey hit their ceilings... (or Coffey and Berry... or Wirsch and Ohlman... you get the picture) then nobody is going to care that Jordan booted the #4 pick in the entire draft.

I generally agree with your post, but this sentence doesn't sit well.

If Hobgood busts, it's bad on almost any level regardless of what anyone else does. There were too many other legit targets at #4 that seemed pretty safe (Matzek - my favorite, Green - a safe bet to be a decent ML player, Wheeler - the other cheap but electric alternative).

I like everything I hear about the guy, but it was clearly a risky pick. I don't think forgiveness for missing on such a pick will be easy unless Jordan overwhelmingly hits on many of those other guys. Even then, there will be a sense of "what were you thinking" if he misses. It's just too high of a position for a good team who needs young players to miss.