now

By "baseball ages" I thought you were going to list years of MLB experience. Pretty light for most of those guys, year 1-2 as regulars!

I'm seeing good movement on Lopez's pitches, rather than nibbling. Impressed so far..

I swear I posted the Miller comp just BEFORE seeing it echoed by Melewski. But it must have occurred to a lot of folks with yesterday's outing.

If we're doing comps how about the SSS version + eye test, I would offer Nunez as Nelson Cruz, Tanner Scott as Andrew Miller. Getting back, so to speak, even for a glimpse, the ones that got away.

Pardon me for relying on memory instead of research, but IIRC back in the glory days (1960-1983) we usually started poorly.

Let's flip the question and look at it from the end: we have a playoff spot to hang onto, with only 40 games left to play.

Yep, while the science can get ever more debatable, there's always good ole religion!

You're right, that 2015 Royals lineup had dangerous depth, with five at 800+ OPS and Zobrist a virtual regular adding a sixth at .816.

I get the analogy but it's obviously overstating the pessimistic view of it. Are we more realistically a .500 club than a true contender? Sure. But the improvements are convincing so far, as well as the chemistry, so a sample of 60 games is closer to our 17.5 game sample than we are predisposed to think (since we're so used to 162).

Two other great teams come to mind with our slash-and-burn, pass-the-baton style of attack: the 2002 Angels and the 2014 Royals. The Angels had five (almost six) regulars with OPS over 800; amazingly, the Royals had none.

It is "real," just not in the way (proof of contention) we want to believe it is (really "for real").

The difference is, that hot stretch for those past clubs was the only winning they did all year. For the 2020 bunch, they've done nothing but win (if you're counting by batches of 17).

I don't remember any Oriole team ever with so many .800+ OPS players in a lineup. Okay maybe 1996, with seven including Ripken just in at .807. What a pleasant surprise to see an O's lineup with: Alberto 928, Santander 837, Iglesius 953, Ruiz 938, Nunez 1036, even Smith 875, Severino 1032, and only Hays 510 and Valaika 734 lagging. Plug in Cisco at 1298 and it's really rocking... (leaving Crushed on the bench). BTW that '96 team was a good guess, ranking tops with 822 in team OPS in Baltimore (the St.L. Browns had 827 in 1922). Before today's 11-4 win the team was tied with the 1998 sluggers and ahead of 1994 and 2004, and those typical starting lineups only feature 3, 6 and 4 players, respectively, with final OPS numbers over 800. Obviously "final" is a key word here, but I can't remember any previous Oriole offense firing on so many cylinders early, either.

Bingo. Yet, strangely enough, that's what we call reality (AKA normal) now.

Says it all. Positive tests? What a travesty, to lose our sport (just sticking to baseball) over this.

Oh well, just add yet another to the long list of asterisks to this barely even virtual season.

Most consistent misses I ever remember seeing. (Recency bias?)

Now that does make sense: greater risk, greater reward. So do healthy pitchers make more than healthy batters? Serious question.

Good point and let's hope that's the case!

Fine to disagree on strategy. But your logic here is not obvious to me. Draft slots are concrete assets. If you lose out on drafting a prospective batter because you draft a pitcher who's likely to disappear from injury, it's just as tangible a loss as throwing a prospect away in a bad trade.

The part you're missing is the wasted draft picks. Busted pitchers don't "cost nothing"--they cost precious draft picks.

I guess it's an endless argument, but I don't buy that logic since it means you're wasting more of your precious draft picks. Draft 10 pitchers, lose 5 to injury... end up with 5 who might be prospects. Draft 10 batters, lose 2 to injury... end up with 8 who might be prospects. Total viable prospects => 13. Draft 16 pitchers, lose 8 to injury... end up with 8 who might be prospects. Draft 4 batters, lose 1 to injury... end up with 3 who might be prospects. Total viable prospects => 11 Draft 6 pitchers, lose 3 to injury... end up with 3 who might be prospects. Draft 14 batters, lose 3 to injury... end up with 11 who might be prospects. Total viable prospects => 14. (or something like that, whatever the actual numbers are). Then you trade and buy to balance out your needs.

I'll trust the analytics department to settle this debate, balancing relative attrition with relative value. Maybe it already works out that way in the market whichever path you choose. Whatever that right answer is, I believe we'll see it in Elias's choices in his body of work. Of course, all the above is about efficiency. If you're the MFY, you just buy whatever you want.

Well, if you've squandered your top draft picks on pitchers whose arms will fail, then you'll have to buy expensive FA bats! Development is a war of attrition and the simple fact is, survival favors the bats. I guess you could say the FA batters also stand to hold up better than the FA pitchers. But if more of your draftees (pitchers) fall by the wayside during development, then you're in for a net loss.

Pitchers' disproportionate fragility, Elias's experience getting burned drafting pitchers high, and the O's decade or more of draft busts all argue against the doomed "Grow the arms" philosophy. Why play the pitching lottery when you can wait and buy proven mound success--or trade for it with a full stable of young homegrown bats?