New Rosenthal column

[Can_of_corn]

Just now, LookinUp said:

For the rebuild to be a success, Elias will have to figure out what went wrong this year, reverse it for a few guys, and not let it happen again.

I'm sure his data is good, but getting pitchers to produce through his data-centric approach seems to have had some hiccups. Maybe they need to bring in someone from Tampa that can teach people.

That implies something went wrong.

[OsFanSinceThe80s]

1 minute ago, LookinUp said:

For the rebuild to be a success, Elias will have to figure out what went wrong this year, reverse it for a few guys, and not let it happen again.

I'm sure his data is good, but getting pitchers to produce through his data-centric approach seems to have had some hiccups. Maybe they need to bring in someone from Tampa that can teach people.

I'm all for poaching talented employees from the Tampa Rays' organization. 

[foxfield]

22 minutes ago, Sports Guy said:

I’m not asking if the rebuild will be viewed as a success.  I’m asking if we will be winning because of it.  Those are 2 different conversations.  
 

I never said anyone is happy with losing  but a lot of people are ok with it and are fine with the idea that they are building something and this takes time.  

Well again, IF the Orioles are successful in 2 or 3 years...of course the answer is yes.  I get that you see it differently and I believe it is semantics.  You say the rebuild is over....I just don't see that way...but again semantics.  So. If I answer based on the rebuild already being over...no.  

[spiritof66]

2 hours ago, OriolesMagic83 said:

2018 led directly to this debacle.  2018 when the O's were "going for it" and had an above average payroll w/ current/former All-Stars like Jones, Machado, Davis and Britton (injured at times).  They also had solid regulars like Gausman, Bundy, O'Day, etc.  2018 was just the worst designed team maybe ever, but the union is ok with them because they were spending money.  The money available to franchises has to be close to average across franchises.  Look how well that has worked in the NFL.  A team with a $70 mill payroll can't compete every year with a team w/ a $200 mill+ payroll.  Some years, they are going to run out of cheap talent, and tanking only makes sense.  Why punish the teams that are trying to compete w/ 1/2 or even 1/3 of the revenue of the top teams instead of the top revenue teams spreading some of their wealth?

That's true, but the problem is only partly about the large differences in teams' MLB payrolls. The core of the problem -- and it's unique to MLB among major American sports -- is the disparity in revenues that teams have: how much money franchises generate, mostly through ticket sales and cable rights fees, and can spend to improve their teams (after giving effect to the minor equalization measures that are in place, like revenue sharing and luxury taxes). 

High-revenue teams can, and generally do, have the highest MLB payrolls. Because those payroll figures are public and readily available, we can compare them and, in many cases, bemoan the large gaps in the payrolls of high-revenue and low-revenue teams. But the higher-revenue franchises have identified other ways of spending money to improve their current and future teams that don't show up in payroll: MLB managers and coaches, scouting, analytical workers and other resources, instructional personnel and equipment, minor league personnel, international scouting, signing bonuses and player development, posting fees for foreign stars, Arizona or Florida training sites, and probably a dozen more things I don't know anything about. While there are figures that enable us to back into estimates of teams' overall expense level, we don't know what teams spend on these things (Other than an occasional announcement of the construction of a new training facility) and so aren't in a position to talk about them, let alone compare them..

A high-revenue team's competitive advantage is not limited to higher MLB payrolls. It's pretty clear that the highest-revenue teams like the NYYs, Dodgers, RS and Cubs, plus some (like the current Mets, apparently, and the Tigers in the past) that are willing to spend from their owners' resources, can afford high MLB payrolls and high spending on the other things they believe will help a team. Lower-revenue teams must choose among payroll and each other item. Most teams, possibly every team, can afford a $100 million payroll, but for many of them raising their payroll to that level will require them to cut back on other things they would prefer to spend on -- adding to the competitive advantage that the higher-revenue teams already enjoy. 

All this helps explains what happened to the Orioles in the last decade. Since buying the team in 1993, Peter Angelos always has devoted a very high portion of his teams' expenses to MLB payrolls. My guess is that operating that way wasn't too unusual in the 1990s. When the ways in which teams invested in finding and developing players broadened, as described above, Angelos continued to put virtually all his eggs in the payroll basket. Whether he didn't understand the changes in the game, or was too stubborn to embrace anything new, or was too arrogant to admit the possibility that he'd been making bad decisions about how the team should be run, Angelos's Orioles skimped on or ignored other kinds of investments described above. His devotion of the Orioles' resources to MLB payroll enabled the Orioles to maintain pretty high MLB payrolls, even after the days of sold-out Camden Yards crowds and winning Oriole teams were over. While that arguably enabled the Orioles to reach the playoffs, by the time Angelos checked out in 2018 it also contributed to their being far behind their competition -- especially their AL East competition -- in access to and development of international players, scouting efforts, minor league player development and the use of analytics. 

[Yossarian]

5 minutes ago, spiritof66 said:

That's true, but the problem is only partly about the large differences in teams' MLB payrolls. The core of the problem -- and it's unique to MLB among major American sports -- is the disparity in revenues that teams have: how much money franchises generate, mostly through ticket sales and cable rights fees, and can spend to improve their teams (after giving effect to the minor equalization measures that are in place, like revenue sharing and luxury taxes). 

High-revenue teams can, and generally do, have the highest MLB payrolls. Because those payroll figures are public and readily available, we can compare them and, in many cases, bemoan the large gaps in the payrolls of high-revenue and low-revenue teams. But the higher-revenue franchises have identified other ways of spending money to improve their current and future teams that don't show up in payroll: MLB managers and coaches, scouting, analytical workers and other resources, instructional personnel and equipment, minor league personnel, international scouting, signing bonuses and player development, posting fees for foreign stars, Arizona or Florida training sites, and probably a dozen more things I don't know anything about. While there are figures that enable us to back into estimates of teams' overall expense level, we don't know what teams spend on these things (Other than an occasional announcement of the construction of a new training facility) and so aren't in a position to talk about them, let alone compare them..

A high-revenue team's competitive advantage is not limited to higher MLB payrolls. It's pretty clear that the highest-revenue teams like the NYYs, Dodgers, RS and Cubs, plus some (like the current Mets, apparently, and the Tigers in the past) that are willing to spend from their owners' resources, can afford high MLB payrolls and high spending on the other things they believe will help a team. Lower-revenue teams must choose among payroll and each other item. Most teams, possibly every team, can afford a $100 million payroll, but for many of them raising their payroll to that level will require them to cut back on other things they would prefer to spend on -- adding to the competitive advantage that the higher-revenue teams already enjoy. 

All this helps explains what happened to the Orioles in the last decade. Since buying the team in 1993, Peter Angelos always has devoted a very high portion of his teams' expenses to MLB payrolls. My guess is that operating that way wasn't too unusual in the 1990s. When the ways in which teams invested in finding and developing players broadened, as described above, Angelos continued to put virtually all his eggs in the payroll basket. Whether he didn't understand the changes in the game, or was too stubborn to embrace anything new, or was too arrogant to admit the possibility that he'd been making bad decisions about how the team should be run, Angelos's Orioles skimped on or ignored other kinds of investments described above. His devotion of the Orioles' resources to MLB payroll enabled the Orioles to maintain pretty high MLB payrolls, even after the days of sold-out Camden Yards crowds and winning Oriole teams were over. While that arguably enabled the Orioles to reach the playoffs, by the time Angelos checked out in 2018 it also contributed to their being far behind their competition -- especially their AL East competition -- in access to and development of international players, scouting efforts, minor league player development and the use of analytics. 

You make a good point about being competitive on a limited budget.  Like you said - maintaining a competitive program requires balancing spending among many things, other than player payroll:

*management

*scouting (including international resources)

*coaching and player development

*stadium and fan experience

to name a few.  large market/large revenue teams have a decided advantage with a larger pool of money.  These teams also end up being preferred destinations during free agency for a lot of players (and their agents $$$$).

[Sports Guy]

13 minutes ago, foxfield said:

Well again, IF the Orioles are successful in 2 or 3 years...of course the answer is yes.  I get that you see it differently and I believe it is semantics.  You say the rebuild is over....I just don't see that way...but again semantics.  So. If I answer based on the rebuild already being over...no.  

What about the rebuild do you think will be the reason we are contenders?

[owknows]

4 hours ago, tntoriole said:

How does this guy actually get paid for this?  

The Baseball Writers Association needs anti-tanking rules.

[NelsonCruuuuuz]

1 hour ago, wildcard said:

Thanks for the nice comments.  Check is in the mail.

The O's have Mullins, Santander, Hays, McKenna, Neustrom and Manicini in the outfield and DH.   Sounds like there is a trade in there somewhere this off season.  Maybe its a real baseball trade of major league players for major league  players. 

I don't know what the O's have with Mateo yet.  He could be a SS or a 2B but so far he looks like a guy that a building team will want to play everyday.   

So the outfield. 1B, C and SS or 2B  are covered.   Elias has to come up with a 2B/SS and a 3B from FA or trade.

I think the O's need to add a SP to Means, Baumann, Tyler Wells, Grayson and Zimmermann in the rotation.

The pen needs a couple of veteran relievers.

So two infielders, a SP, and two relievers.   And Mancini is probably trade bait to get one of them.   I don't want any of the FAs on more than a one or two year contract because what is coming behind them in the minors.

Is it doable? Yes.   Will the O's do it?  I don't know. But it will be interesting to watch.  I think it could be a .500 team if done right.

You say the O's are not close to stop tanking.  I say don't waste the Adley and Grayson years.  Do what is required to improve the team.

 

I forgot CF in Mullins just because I wonder if he will be traded but he you can build around! Agreed!

I hope you are right Sir. Thanks for responding!

Edited August 23, 2021 by NelsonCruuuuuz

[NCRaven]

8 minutes ago, Sports Guy said:

What about the rebuild do you think will be the reason we are contenders?

Top 3 farm system and greater commitment to the international market are two reasons.  Biggest question, will they spend to improve the teams in areas that they haven't addressed through those two areas.  I think Means, Rodriguez and Hall are a good start on the rotation, but signing a Gray type of pitcher to a multi-year contract would be a step in the right direction.  Wouldn't mind Josh Harrison on a two-year deal either.

[Sports Guy]

Just now, NCRaven said:

Top 3 farm system and greater commitment to the international market are two reasons.  Biggest question, will they spend to improve the teams in areas that they haven't addressed through those two areas.  I think Means, Rodriguez and Hall are a good start on the rotation, but signing a Gray type of pitcher to a multi-year contract would be a step in the right direction.  Wouldn't mind Josh Harrison on a two-year deal either.

International commitment has zero to do with rebuilding.

[Tony-OH]

41 minutes ago, Can_of_corn said:

I'm sure Elias and Ownership would be in favor of only MASN reporting on them.

This is funny, but unfortunately true. The Orioles are trying to control all information coming out of the organization and trying to funnel it through their own MASN reporters.

Meanwhile players get promoted and fall off the face of the earth and you can't get any information (See JD Mundy).

Maybe Melewski can get some info on him because unless I missed it, he hasn't wrote anything in his column about him despite the fact that he was literally promoted to Bowie, is on the active roster, but hasn't appeared in a game.

 

[Tony-OH]

Just now, Sports Guy said:

International commitment has zero to do with rebuilding.

Huh? This doesn't make any sense at face value. Can you explain your line of thinking here?

[NCRaven]

2 minutes ago, Sports Guy said:

International commitment has zero to do with rebuilding.

To the extent that it helps to build an even better pipeline of talent, sure it does.

[Tony-OH]

31 minutes ago, spiritof66 said:

That's true, but the problem is only partly about the large differences in teams' MLB payrolls. The core of the problem -- and it's unique to MLB among major American sports -- is the disparity in revenues that teams have: how much money franchises generate, mostly through ticket sales and cable rights fees, and can spend to improve their teams (after giving effect to the minor equalization measures that are in place, like revenue sharing and luxury taxes). 

High-revenue teams can, and generally do, have the highest MLB payrolls. Because those payroll figures are public and readily available, we can compare them and, in many cases, bemoan the large gaps in the payrolls of high-revenue and low-revenue teams. But the higher-revenue franchises have identified other ways of spending money to improve their current and future teams that don't show up in payroll: MLB managers and coaches, scouting, analytical workers and other resources, instructional personnel and equipment, minor league personnel, international scouting, signing bonuses and player development, posting fees for foreign stars, Arizona or Florida training sites, and probably a dozen more things I don't know anything about. While there are figures that enable us to back into estimates of teams' overall expense level, we don't know what teams spend on these things (Other than an occasional announcement of the construction of a new training facility) and so aren't in a position to talk about them, let alone compare them..

A high-revenue team's competitive advantage is not limited to higher MLB payrolls. It's pretty clear that the highest-revenue teams like the NYYs, Dodgers, RS and Cubs, plus some (like the current Mets, apparently, and the Tigers in the past) that are willing to spend from their owners' resources, can afford high MLB payrolls and high spending on the other things they believe will help a team. Lower-revenue teams must choose among payroll and each other item. Most teams, possibly every team, can afford a $100 million payroll, but for many of them raising their payroll to that level will require them to cut back on other things they would prefer to spend on -- adding to the competitive advantage that the higher-revenue teams already enjoy. 

All this helps explains what happened to the Orioles in the last decade. Since buying the team in 1993, Peter Angelos always has devoted a very high portion of his teams' expenses to MLB payrolls. My guess is that operating that way wasn't too unusual in the 1990s. When the ways in which teams invested in finding and developing players broadened, as described above, Angelos continued to put virtually all his eggs in the payroll basket. Whether he didn't understand the changes in the game, or was too stubborn to embrace anything new, or was too arrogant to admit the possibility that he'd been making bad decisions about how the team should be run, Angelos's Orioles skimped on or ignored other kinds of investments described above. His devotion of the Orioles' resources to MLB payroll enabled the Orioles to maintain pretty high MLB payrolls, even after the days of sold-out Camden Yards crowds and winning Oriole teams were over. While that arguably enabled the Orioles to reach the playoffs, by the time Angelos checked out in 2018 it also contributed to their being far behind their competition -- especially their AL East competition -- in access to and development of international players, scouting efforts, minor league player development and the use of analytics. 

Super post. Pretty hard to argue with anything here!

[UMDTerrapins]

3 minutes ago, Tony-OH said:

Huh? This doesn't make any sense at face value. Can you explain your line of thinking here?

I think it's part of larger point he's making that you don't have to rebuild/tank because the talent you can acquire through the draft can be replicated through international development and shrewd trades, and that the amateur draft is largely a crap shoot.