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Bill James on Dave Trembley


DrungoHazewood

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A week or so ago it quantified as around 10 runs lost (= 1 game), according to EqBRR at BP.

That's pretty terrible. Last year, if my "back of the envelope" addition is correct, we were about 18 runs lost for the whole season. This year we are on pace to lose 40. We have gotten steadily worse since 2006, the year Perlozzo was the manager all season, until now. That is the one area where I definitely feel Perlozzo was a much better manager than Trembley. He had a much better idea of how aggresive to be or not be on the bases.

Edit

2006 (Perlozzo) - 9th

2007 (Perlozzo/Trembley) - 19th

2008 (Trembley) - 30th

2009 (Trembley) - 29th

It's nice when statistical evidence actually back up your observations, even though I don't like the conclusion.

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Well, none of us are saying that.

I think we're really just disagreeing on what you need to make even-keeled decisions. I think if you are making decisions based on logic (which isn't just stats or scouting, by the way: you can do some experimenting within logic), you are always on OK ground.

And I'm willing to give him time. I just think we should be seeing improvement soon, and that we should be willing to point out mistakes in a reasonable manner both without a reactionary attitude or an attitude that the complaints are reactionary. Both sides go too far.

Fair enough. I've said this year - I want to see what he does when some of our guys coming up show up and help out.

No big deal. I'm not sold on him for the future (though I'd like to see him stick in the organization if he doesn't last at manager). But I really think we haven't seen him enough, yet, in the appropriate circumstances.

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High-risk moves should still make sense and be defendable. Do you really think the potential scenarios I mentioned are defendable?

I'm just wondering why you think we should wait until our manager is blowing games we should win to worry about the moves being made. Do you believe we shouldn't be looking for bullpen help because we aren't in a position to win anyway so it doesn't matter yet?

Most of his moves do make sense and are defendable. The fact that you can point to a couple of anecdotal incidents where his moves don't make sense to you, is hardly a convincing argument. Most of what you post makes little sense to me. If you can itemize a goodly number of DT decisions and demonstrate their lack of reason, then I might take you and SG more seriously than the Randy Quaid character in Major League II.:laughlol:

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Do you think the players quit in September of '07 and '08?

I do

I dont.

There is no doubt that they performed badly at the annual end of the year nosedive. But the question is why? BP overuse throughout the year leaving bad pitchers pitching worse on tired arms. Tired legs played too long throughout the year because of no meaningful bench. Bad players playing badly because they are bad and tired. Playing playoff teams against better players.

Lot of reasons but I have never thought they gave up on Dave despite their poor performance. I just thought the teams were bad.

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You and LJ both have good points. I'm not sure how you think high risk moves can be defended. Typically such moves go against conventional thinking which makes their success rate less. And then when they fail, was it necessarily the wrong thing to do? Sometimes doing what the opposition doesn't expect is the right thing to do whether it succeeds or not (obviously not taling about pitching here). I do agree that DT has some rigid methodolgy that doesn't play well in his circumstances. He should be more flexible in his approach.

Well, what's a high-risk move?

If you want to experiment, that's fine. That's defendable on a team where you are trying to evaluate players.

But simply making seemingly strange decisions and not giving any logic for them is just a bad move.

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That's pretty terrible. Last year, if my "back of the envelope" addition is correct, we were about 18 runs lost for the whole season. This year we are on pace to lose 40. We have gotten steadily worse since 2006, the year Perlozzo was the manager all season, until now. That is the one area where I definitely feel Perlozzo was a much better manager than Trembley. He had a much better idea of how aggresive to be or not be on the bases.

Edit

2006 (Perlozzo) - 9th

2007 (Perlozzo/Trembley) - 19th

2008 (Trembley) - 30th

2009 (Trembley) - 30th

It's nice when statistical evidence actually back up your observations, even though I don't like the conclusion.

That is a scary conclusion, all right. And I remember Perlozzo (subjectively) as being a terrible small-ball manager - but then again, I hate seeing any manager do it.

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Well, what's a high-risk move?

If you want to experiment, that's fine. That's defendable on a team where you are trying to evaluate players.

But simply making seemingly strange decisions and not giving any logic for them is just a bad move.

I don't think using Sherrill against the heart of the Yanks order is indefensible, if you're trying to figure out if he can be a closer with his reclaimed mechanics. I don't think we can expect Trembley to abandon the idea of having a closer. That said, I don't think anyone on our roster right now fits the profile.

And I don't think playing Wigginton yesterday was indefensible.

So, what are the decisions made "without any logic" and we'll go from there?

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I don't think using Sherrill against the heart of the Yanks order is indefensible, if you're trying to figure out if he can be a closer with his reclaimed mechanics. I don't think we can expect Trembley to abandon the idea of having a closer. That said, I don't think anyone on our roster right now fits the profile.

On the other hand, that "heart of the order" is 3/4 right-handed (against him, with Teixiera as a switch-hitter), which I think we have enough of a track record in Sherrill's case to say that it's an illogical decision.

So, even if you are going to have a closer, shouldn't it be someone that is at least decent against all kinds of hitters?

And even if you want to experiment after mechanics changes, wouldn't it be a good idea to wait until you are facing a less-dangerous lineup to do that?

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Could this be a case of James seeing the names Weaver and Johnson and giving the reader what he wants to hear? I would have to assume Henry F is an O's fan.

Then again it seems James is more impressed with his demeanor then his actual skills. I will agree that DT has a great demeanor.

That's it. The guy who asked the question mentioned two former O's manager, and Bill James commented on the current skipper, nothing more.

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That's pretty terrible. Last year, if my "back of the envelope" addition is correct, we were about 18 runs lost for the whole season. This year we are on pace to lose 40. We have gotten steadily worse since 2006, the year Perlozzo was the manager all season, until now. That is the one area where I definitely feel Perlozzo was a much better manager than Trembley. He had a much better idea of how aggresive to be or not be on the bases.

Edit

2006 (Perlozzo) - 9th

2007 (Perlozzo/Trembley) - 19th

2008 (Trembley) - 30th

2009 (Trembley) - 29th

It's nice when statistical evidence actually back up your observations, even though I don't like the conclusion.

That is a scary conclusion, all right. And I remember Perlozzo (subjectively) as being a terrible small-ball manager - but then again, I hate seeing any manager do it.

Two points:

1. It's important to realize there have been some significant personnel changes in these years. Most importantly, the 2006/07 teams had Corey Patterson, who stole a lot of bases and had a high percentage. So, not all of the slippage is necessarily due to the manager.

2. The problem with Perlozzo's "small ball" wouldn't be reflected in these stats. His problem was overuse of the sacrifice bunt, and that's definitely documentable as well. But this stat is merely measuring the cost/benefit of extra bases taken (either on steals or advancing and extra base on hits, etc.) vs. extra outs on the bases. There, Perlozzo was pretty good. His teams stole a lot of bases while getting caught very infrequently.

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Well, what's a high-risk move?

If you want to experiment, that's fine. That's defendable on a team where you are trying to evaluate players.

But simply making seemingly strange decisions and not giving any logic for them is just a bad move.

Can doing something the opposition doesn't expect = logic that is defendable?

Obviously that's a tad vague, but for example a hit a run with Huff on first base and Mora at the plate? Mora misses and Huff's dead meat for a double play. I suppose this could be considered high risk? While hitting and running with Moeller and Andino would be a stupid move? Perhaps I need more clarification between a high risk move, and just doing something stupid.

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The problem with Perlozzo's "small ball" wouldn't be reflected in these stats. His problem was overuse of the sacrifice bunt, and that's definitely documentable as well. But this stat is merely measuring the cost/benefit of extra bases taken (either on steals or advancing and extra base on hits, etc.) vs. extra outs on the bases. There, Perlozzo was pretty good. His teams stole a lot of bases while getting caught very infrequently.

Good points. I cringe just thinking about all those 1st-inning sacrifice bunts! :cussing:

And it would be good for Trembley to be more selective on the base stealing for higher odds of success (no more sending Huff!). Even BRob's 10/14 is right at the margin of usefulness (71%). (BTW did we establish if the pickoffs are included in the CS?)

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Can doing something the opposition doesn't expect = logic that is defendable?

Obviously that's a tad vague, but for example a hit a run with Huff on first base and Mora at the plate? Mora misses and Huff's dead meat for a double play. I suppose this could be considered high risk? While hitting and running with Moeller and Andino would be a stupid move? Perhaps I need more clarification between a high risk move, and just doing something stupid.

I think you need it to be more than just "unexpected" for it to be OK. It would depend on the situation.

In what you are asking about, I think that if it's done sparingly it can be effective (although I've always been a little wary of Mora's baseball IQ, so he might not be the guy you want when he HAS to make contact). Ernie Lombardi was a catcher from the 1930s and '40s and may have been the slowest runner in the history of the sport, but he would steal a base every few years because he would just take off and the catcher would freeze or no one would cover second or something like that. That can be a logical, defensable move.

If you start doing it regularly though, or with the wrong type of players, then it's really no longer "unexpected" and just poor strategy.

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Good points. I cringe just thinking about all those 1st-inning sacrifice bunts! :cussing:

And it would be good for Trembley to be more selective on the base stealing for higher odds of success (no more sending Huff!). Even BRob's 10/14 is right at the margin of usefulness (71%). (BTW did we establish if the pickoffs are included in the CS?)

I believe the rule is that if the runner heads to 2B, it is treated as a caught stealing, but if the runner is tagged while diving to 1B, it is a pickoff and not a CS. And I believe BRob has been picked off twice in a manner that would not be counted as a CS. But I'm not 100% sure.

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