Found a decade old article that kind of explains why in the rebuild Elias did not draft pitchers with high picks.

[Gurgi]

https://www.royalsreview.com/2011/2/14/1992424/success-and-failure-rates-of-top-mlb-prospects

My goal with this table was to show what percentage of players failed "Bust", succeeded at all "Success" and became stars (or at least exceptionally good players) "Superior". Fewer than one-third of top 100 prospects succeed in the majors, but there is a big difference between position players and pitchers. While nearly two out of five position players in the top 100 succeed, fewer than one in four pitchers do. And of course many fewer prospects achieve superior success in the majors. A little under one in four position player prospects become stars, while only one in ten pitchers have that level of success.

That is a lot of data to sift through. But if we focus on the overall success and failure rates, we can see some huge differences between position players and pitchers. Position players ranked in the top 20 had a very high success rate at about 60%, while pitchers in the same group only succeeded about 40% of the time. And position players in the higher ranks level out at a success rate in the mid-to-high 20’s. The success rate for pitchers in the higher ranks levels out in the mid-to-high teens. Because of the smaller samples you get to when you break down deciles into the "superior" group, the variance is high. But we can see in the lower ranks, about 40% of position players become stars, while for pitchers it is more like 20-25%. And while a significant percentage of position players in the higher ranks become stars (as much as 23% in the 70-79 decile), the percentages for pitchers in the higher ranks are consistently under 10%.

We can now see clear and meaningful differences between the various rankings. Top 20 prospects have a good deal of success, with more than half succeeding in the majors. Prospects ranked 21-40 have a much lower success rate, under 30%, but have a high percentage of players that contribute in the majors (0.50-1.49 WAR). Interestingly, there is little difference in the success and failure rates of prospects ranked 41 and higher.

 

I think several conclusions are warranted, at least for the period of the study (which includes a great many current major league players).

• About 70% of Baseball America top 100 prospects fail.
• Position player prospects succeed much more often than pitching prospects.
• About 60% of position players ranked in Baseball America’s top 20 succeed in the majors.
• About 40% of pitchers ranked in the top 20 succeed in the majors.
• About 30% of position players ranked 21-100 succeed in the majors (with the success rate declining over that ranking range from about 36% to about 25%)
• About 20% of pitchers ranked 21-100 succeed in the majors (with the success rate declining over that ranking range from about 22% to about 15%)
• The success rate of prospects (both position player and pitchers) is nearly flat and relatively undifferentiated for players ranked 41-100, and especially those ranked 61-100.
• Corner infield prospects and catchers are the most likely to succeed in the majors, but outfielders, third basemen and shortstops are the most likely to become stars. Second basemen and pitchers are the least likely prospects to succeed in the majors or to become stars.
• Prospect success rates have not improved much over time and there is little data to support the contention that prospects are more likely to succeed now than they have in the past.

As with the breakdown by decile, we see huge differences between position players and pitchers. Top 20 position player prospects succeed at a rate more than 50% higher than their pitching counterparts. The differences between higher ranked position players and pitchers is of a smaller magnitude but it is still significant and it is consistent. Higher ranked position players succeed at around a 30% rate, while similar pitchers succeed only about 20% of the time.

Edited September 16, 2022 by Gurgi

[Gurgi]

I think we already heard a lot about this aspect of why Elias did not draft pitchers high in the draft.  Was cool to actually see some of the data about why he skipped on pitchers.   We were so bad we could not risk the higher fail rate of pitchers when we desperately needed to fill with as much talent as we could.   I would imagine Elias in the future will still draft more positional players over pitchers high in the draft but probably as the Orioles get more successful Elias might pounce on some arms but likely the pitcher would have to be "special" in some way.   

[Frobby]

I think there’s been a lot of research like this, including some that shows college hitters to be the least risky, high school pitchers the most risky.   There are other parts of the equation, though, like how much upside is there if the player does succeed.  I think Elias has been very methodical in his approach and doesn’t let “gut feelings” about individual players overwhelm the megatrends.  

[Sports Guy]

It’s always been the correct strategy to load up on positional talent.

Of course, when you do that, you create a lot of depth in some areas and once that depth has been established, trades need to occur.

That is where the team is.  We will see what they do with that from here.  This is part 2 of that strategy.

[Jammer7]

The only thing about pitcher failure rates that I have seen over the years is who does the best job? And why? To say only one in four pitchers in the BA Top 100 succeeded is meaningful. But going forward, who does it best and why would be good to know. Cleveland, Tampa, Dodgers, Houston…Orioles? Are we in that realm?

[DrungoHazewood]

52 minutes ago, Frobby said:

I think there’s been a lot of research like this, including some that shows college hitters to be the least risky, high school pitchers the most risky.   There are other parts of the equation, though, like how much upside is there if the player does succeed.  I think Elias has been very methodical in his approach and doesn’t let “gut feelings” about individual players overwhelm the megatrends.  

The high school/college gap in draftees has considerably narrowed over time.  If you decide to rarely or never pick high school pitchers you'd have missed out on any number of stars like Maddux, Clemens, Schilling, Verlander, Glavine, Kershaw, Smoltz, Halladay, Sabathia, Pettitte, Saberhagen.  Just scanning the list of WAR leaders since 1980 it looks like a majority of the top 20 never went to college.

[tntoriole]

The difficulty of course, speaking as a psychiatrist, is that a person’s future behavior and performance can often turn out very differently than what we might predict. 
Because we learn and change.  So someone at 18 that looks like the next superstar ends up not continuing to develop and change but a Mike Trout or an Albert Pujols does.

While scouting and rankings and prospect based analytics are important, an organization’s supportive development ability is even more so. 

And Elias’s rebuilding has really transformed that part for the better. 

[SteveA]

Earlier this year I heard part of an Elias interview where he talked about college pitchers, and how the fastball velocity can go in two different directions:

1) Sometimes when they get to minor league ball with the longer season they can't go max effort as much and they don't regularly hit the velocity they did in college.

2) Sometimes it's just the opposite and with better coaching and conditioning they actually settle in at a higher velocity on average than they did in college.

He seemed to imply that it's not always easy to tell which way a pitcher will go, and that he is more comfortable trading for a college pitcher a year or two after he has gone pro than drafting one.

I think it might have been in reference to Cade Povich, whom I also have heard Elias talk glowingly about and how he could be a factor at the major league level in 2023.

[Jagwar]

3 hours ago, Sports Guy said:

It’s always been the correct strategy to load up on positional talent.

Of course, when you do that, you create a lot of depth in some areas and once that depth has been established, trades need to occur.

That is where the team is.  We will see what they do with that from here.  This is part 2 of that strategy.

I suppose what makes it even more tricky is that all teams are looking for pitching. I wonder how many teams are willing to give up solid pitching for a package that doesn't include pitching prospects. 

[btdart20]

4 hours ago, Jammer7 said:

The only thing about pitcher failure rates that I have seen over the years is who does the best job? And why? To say only one in four pitchers in the BA Top 100 succeeded is meaningful. But going forward, who does it best and why would be good to know. Cleveland, Tampa, Dodgers, Houston…Orioles? Are we in that realm?

Agreed!  Those teams must have a type and a plan with their type.  Throw in ATL as good org at ID'ing pitching talent.

The O's seem good at identifying talent when there's data (spin rates, etc.) on pitchers.  Our bullpen is stocked with examples of that.  But colleges are just now starting to add the type of tech the O's are using.  In 2019, only 55 colleges used TrackMan.  The tech investment is definitely rising.  

Colleges follow trend, tap into baseball analytics (sportsbusinessjournal.com)

And only select HS programs have TrackMan, Rapsodo, and other tech that can provide that data.  

 

I suspect the injury rate still tilts the odds in favor of drafting the position player as much as anything else though. 

 

4 hours ago, tntoriole said:

The difficulty of course, speaking as a psychiatrist, is that a person’s future behavior and performance can often turn out very differently than what we might predict. 
Because we learn and change.  So someone at 18 that looks like the next superstar ends up not continuing to develop and change but a Mike Trout or an Albert Pujols does.

While scouting and rankings and prospect based analytics are important, an organization’s supportive development ability is even more so. 

And Elias’s rebuilding has really transformed that part for the better. 

Have you heard of Kathryn Rowe?  (Sounds like you have.)  Elias brought her in a mental coach on the staff.  I recall reading some interesting articles during spring training where I was impressed with her engagement with many of our prospects.  I suspect she's part of the Round Table counsel as they piece together their draft rankings.  And maybe even part of identifying guys like Chirinos and Odor for their veteranosity (sp?).

[crowmst3k!]

I remember the draft where the Orioles took Dylan Bundy. Anthony Rendon was sitting right there, and I remember @Sports Guy saying 'They can't be this stupid, can they?'  

Well, they were. Rendon has over 4x the career WAR of Bundy.  

Orioles also whiffed when they took Matusz, Hobgood, Sedlock. Gausman was ok, but the O's didn't get his best years.  Rodriguez looks to be legit, but he's still yet to pitch an MLB inning, and the book on Hall is unwritten.  

Pitchers are a crapshoot. 

[vab]

This is not really a revelation. Even my cursory observation of minor league prospects clearly shows it's much easier to develop position players than pitchers, especially starting pitchers. Loading up on position players prospects and trading from the surplus for pitchers who at least have a few successful pro seasons under their belts is really the only way to go unless you have an established position player group in the majors. Then you probably afford to take a few more shots at pitching in the draft. 

[Redskins Rick]

6 minutes ago, crowmst3k! said:

I remember the draft where the Orioles took Dylan Bundy. Anthony Rendon was sitting right there, and I remember @Sports Guy saying 'They can't be this stupid, can they?'  

Well, they were. Rendon has over 4x the career WAR of Bundy.  

Orioles also whiffed when they took Matusz, Hobgood, Sedlock. Gausman was ok, but the O's didn't get his best years.  Rodriguez looks to be legit, but he's still yet to pitch an MLB inning, and the book on Hall is unwritten.  

Pitchers are a crapshoot. 

Pitchers are a crapshoot.

Look at Gausman. He might have benefited for better coaching and allowed to throw his goto pitch more.

Arrieta was certainly the benefit of better coaching.

Ed-Rod was a mid guy here in AA, not a blue chipper, yet, look at him.

Zach Britton was running out of rope here, until he came up with his goto pitch that made him unhittable and a stud closer.

Im not going to yell about Hobgood, lots of organizations can point to clue chippers that dont pan out.

 

[Jammer7]

8 hours ago, DrungoHazewood said:

The high school/college gap in draftees has considerably narrowed over time.  If you decide to rarely or never pick high school pitchers you'd have missed out on any number of stars like Maddux, Clemens, Schilling, Verlander, Glavine, Kershaw, Smoltz, Halladay, Sabathia, Pettitte, Saberhagen.  Just scanning the list of WAR leaders since 1980 it looks like a majority of the top 20 never went to college.

Roger Clemens went to University of Texas and Verlander went to ODU. But your point is certainly valid. It has to be judicious, I think. Look at Andrew Painter with the Phillies right now. Had an amazing year in the minors at 19. 

[Jammer7]

3 hours ago, crowmst3k! said:

I remember the draft where the Orioles took Dylan Bundy. Anthony Rendon was sitting right there, and I remember @Sports Guy saying 'They can't be this stupid, can they?'  

Well, they were. Rendon has over 4x the career WAR of Bundy.  

Orioles also whiffed when they took Matusz, Hobgood, Sedlock. Gausman was ok, but the O's didn't get his best years.  Rodriguez looks to be legit, but he's still yet to pitch an MLB inning, and the book on Hall is unwritten.  

Pitchers are a crapshoot. 

Would the current development group have had better success with that group? We’ll never know for sure, but I think so. Even in a crap shoot, there are groups who do it better than the others. The former regime was way behind the times.