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The lost "Orioles Way"


Tony-OH

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2 hours ago, Tony-OH said:

I was 13 years old when the Orioles beat the Phillies in the 1983 World Series. I still remember watching Scott McGregor make that pitch and Cal Ripken making a two-handed catch to finish off the series. 

In my lifetime, the Orioles had never had losing record, and in fact won less than 90 games only three times, two of which were strike shortened years (1972-1981). If you go back to 1966, the Orioles had appeared in six World Series, won three, and made it to the playoffs in eight of those years. A big part of that was the "Orioles Way"

The Orioles Way was real as players learned it from the time they were signed, through the minor league and onto the big league team. Everything from how to take leads, make cut offs, work counts in order to get on base (working a walk was encouraged), and to "Work Fast, Change Speeds, Throw Strikes" was taught to everyone. "Perfect practice makes perfect" was a Cal Ripken Sr. motto that they lived by. The overall belief was that hard work, professionalism, and a strong understanding of fundamentals were the keys to success at the major league level. 

The Orioles never had the highest paid players or signed the best free agents, but they won year and year out because the Orioles were a synchronized cohesive organization. They had great managers and coaches, many of which would go on and manage elsewhere. Heck, my High School coach Harry Lentz was a "bird dog" scout and friends with Cal Ripken Sr. and he taught us the Orioles Way at Northeast Highschool!  Despite the fact that our high school rarely even put kids into college baseball, we were always in the running for County and sometime state Championships in in 1991 the school won a "National Championship" under Lentz. Why? Lentz and Coach Kohlhafer were great coaches, but we were taught and used the "Orioles Way".

In fact, I truly believe my knowledge and love of baseball to this day was cemented by the Orioles Way.

In 18 years under the "Orioles Way" (1966-1983), the Orioles did the following:

.588 - Winning Percentage (1168-1168)
17 - Winning Seasons
0 - .500 seasons
1 - Under .500 Season
6 - World Series
3 - World Championships
8 - Playoff Appearances 
8 - ALCS appearences
8 - Division Championships
 

The Orioles eventually would go away from the "Orioles Way" as Earl Weaver retired and Cal Ripken Sr. was fired. They started trying to fill voids with second class free agents and their drafting and development started to go downhill.

In the last 35 years since that World Series, the Orioles have done the following:

.475 - Winning Percentage (2612-2879)
11 - Winning Seasons
1 - .500 season
22 - Under .500 seasons
0 - World Series
5 - Playoff Appearances
3 - ALCS appearences
2 - Division Championships

Now I know you can't really know when the Orioles way stopped being taught, but many feel when Cal Sr. was fired so did the Orioles way, though the way the team was being built certainly had changed before then. 

Regardless, until the Orioles can find someone to lead them that will once again instill an "Orioles way" throughout the organization, this organization will remain the dysfunctional mess it's been for most of the last 35 years. 

 

I wasn't alive for they heyday of the Oriole Way tbut boy does it sound effing glorious! 

The only comparable things I can think of in modern sports are the ways both the New England Patriots and the San Antonio Spurs are run, top to bottom, with complete cohesion.

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2 hours ago, Aristotelian said:

 

Pitching, defense, and three run homers. Minus pitching, minus defense, and only solo homers due to poor OBP. Not a great recipe for success. I'm surprised that it worked as long as it did.

 

o

 

And in some case, stolen bases.

Earl was unquestionably a three-run home run type of manager first and foremost, but he didn't eschew small ball and stolen bases as much as his reputation might have made it appear that he did.

 

The 1973 Orioles led the league in stolen bases. ) :o

Between 1972 and 1976, the Orioles finished 5th, 1st (led the league), 3rd, 5th, and 4th in the league in stolen bases, respectively.

They also finished 5th in the league in 1970, and 6th (out of 14 teams) in 1980. Al Bumbry stole 44 bases for that 100-win team that season.

 

Reggie Jackson was one of the greatest power hitters ever. In his lone season playing for Weaver he missed the first month of the 1976 season, and he still set a career-high in stolen bases (28.)

 

o

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Oh.....

 

Tony, I am a little older as I was 20 in 83 when Cal made that catch. But you are all over what is missing. I fear that while kudos go th Mr. Angelos for making sure Jeffery Loria didn’t end up with the club, we are not going to see the Oriole Way return under current ownership. 

Edit to add:  To me the Oriole way was all of the little things and by virtue of such, there was ACCOUNTABILITY!!!

To me, that is what is lacking top to bottom today.

 

Anyway, great post. 

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41 minutes ago, OFFNY said:

o

 

And in some case, stolen bases.

Earl was unquestionably a three-run home run type of manager first and foremost, but he didn't eschew small ball and stolen bases as much as his reputation might have made it appear that he did.

 

The 1973 Orioles led the league in stolen bases. ) :o

Between 1972 and 1976, the Orioles finished 5th, 1st (led the league), 3rd, 5th, and 4th in the league in stolen bases, respectively.

They also finished 5th in the league in 1970, and 6th (out of 14 teams) in 1980. Al Bumbry stole 44 bases for that 100-win team that season.

 

Reggie Jackson was one of the greatest power hitters ever. In his lone season playing for Weaver he missed the first month of the 1976 season, and he still set a career-high in stolen bases (28.)

 

o

You're right about Earl and small ball. But what Earl was opposed to, contrary to the conventional wisdom at that time, was bunting (unless there was a clear need to get a single run). He didn't like to give up outs.

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During my youth, I saw all the World Series teams and seasons and years where the Orioles just were better than any team, most every year.   And it actually goes back to Paul Richards instituting a training system that Cal Sr. and Earl picked up and added to in Elmira and Rochester and then in the majors. 

I agree that the philosophy was essential, but the biggest change was free agency.  Dynastic teams came about back then because if you drafted a star like Brooks or Palmer or traded well, you could then keep your star players for as many years as they remained productive. l

Once free agency hit,  it changed everything about how teams were put together.  Then add in perhaps the worst drafting of players in the history of baseball during the Syd Thrift etc. era and it really clobbered the organization. The Oriole Way would make little difference if you still drafted that kind of lousy talent.  

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10 minutes ago, foxfield said:

Oh.....

 

Tony, I am a little older as I was 20 in 83 when Cal made that catch. But you are all over what is missing. I fear that while kudos go th Mr. Angelos for making sure Jeffery Loria didn’t end up with the club, we are not going to see the Oriole Way return under current ownership. 

Edit to add:  To me the Oriole way was all of the little things and by virtue of such, there was ACCOUNTABILITY!!!

To me, that is what is lacking top to bottom today.

 

Anyway, great post. 

Tillman puts up an historically bad season.  No problem, here is a.$3M contract guaranteed!

Davis putting up the worst season ever by a positional player and Buck plays him every single day.

Players have no plate discipline or plan at the plate?  No problem, they will mash home runs when the weather hits 80 degrees.

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14 hours ago, spiritof66 said:

You're right about Earl and small ball. But what Earl was opposed to, contrary to the conventional wisdom at that time, was bunting (unless there was a clear need to get a single run). He didn't like to give up outs.

You know, Earl’s aversion to the sac bunt is highly exaggerated.    The O’s had the 2nd most sac bunts in the AL 1969 and 1971 and  were in the top half of the league several other times, including in Earl’s final season before his first retirement.    If I had to estimate, I’d say his use of the sac bunt was only slightly below average over the course of his career.   

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Interestingly, in the Orioles’ two best years under Buck (2012 and 2014), they were in the top half of the league in sac bunts.    They were near the bottom all the other years under Buck, bottoming out at 10 last year, 2nd fewest in the league.    

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2 hours ago, Frobby said:

You know, Earl’s aversion to the sac bunt is highly exaggerated.    The O’s had the 2nd most sac bunts in the AL 1969 and 1971 and  were in the top half of the league several other times, including in Earl’s final season before his first retirement.    If I had to estimate, I’d say his use of the sac bunt was only slightly below average over the course of his career.   

I pasted an excerpt below From an excellent SABR article, it seemed that several things changed that affected this..before the DH, sacrifice bunts were more done by pitchers of course and since the Orioles starting pitchers both stayed in games longer than league average they were not pinch hit for and would bunt more...and also Mark Belanger bunted a lot more than average because his hitting was not good.. and also the Os lower order guys typically performed better during those years than league average, thus making sacrifices even more likely for us. since those guys would be on base for the pitcher....  It changed a lot after the DH came in as outlined below...

 

“THE ORIOLES' SACRIFICES

Soderholm-Table-1.large%20thumbnail.jpgIt is well known that Earl Weaver hated the sacrifice bunt as wasting a precious out: “There are only three outs an inning, and they should be treasured. Give one away and you’re making everything harder for yourself.”7 It is not that Weaver thought that bunting was never appropriate—“I’ve got nothing against the bunt—in its place”8—but that its place was limited to where it gave his team a chance to win a game in the late innings.

None of his teams ever led the league in sacrifices, but in Weaver’s first seven full seasons as manager, the Orioles were in the top three of the 12 American League teams in sacrifice bunt attempts every year. In four of those years, Baltimore had more sacrifice attempts than any other team in the league, and twice the second most. We must allow, however, for the fact that until 1973, when the designated hitter rule went into effect, American League pitchers were still required to hit for themselves. Exactly half of the 288 sacrifice bunts laid down by the Orioles from 1969 to 1972 were by the pitcher, according to the data, and Weaver’s pitchers had more opportunities to attempt a sacrifice both because the on-base-percentage (OBP) of Baltimore batters (not including pitchers) in the bottom third of the order was generally comparable to the team’s OBP as a whole, and because Baltimore’s superior starting rotation often pitched late into games allowing them more plate appearances. 

Even after the DH came into being, however, the Orioles still led the league in sacrifice attempts the first two years, and were third the year after that (1975). But these years coincided with Baltimore’s (temporary) drop in home run power, previously mentioned. It wasn’t until 1977 that the number of sacrifice attempts ordered by Weaver dropped dramatically. In 1978 and 1979, the Orioles were last and next to last in the league in attempted sacrifices, in 1980 they attempted the third fewest, and in 1981 the fifth fewest. After averaging 99 sacrifice attempts per year from 1973 (the first year of the DH, so no pitchers batting) to 1976, Weaver’s Orioles averaged 65 per year from 1977 to 1982, not including the 1981 strike-shortened season, a 34-percent drop.

There are two other indicators of Weaver disdaining the sacrifice even more after 1977 than before. From 1969 to 1976, according to the data, 64 percent of Baltimore’s sacrifice bunts came in victories and 22 percent in the seventh inning or later with the score tied, the Orioles ahead by one, or behind but with the potential tying run on base, at the plate, or on deck. From 1977 to 1982, by contrast, 75 percent of the Orioles’ sacrifices came in victories, and only 15 percent in the seventh inning or later in close games. This means that Weaver became more reluctant to bunt both when his team was losing and when his team needed a run in a close game in the late innings. In either situation, it is apparent Weaver was more inclined after 1977 to let his hitters hit—looking for that home run to instantly make up ground, or for hits to get more runners on base and drive in runs.

Weaver was consistent throughout his managerial career in rarely bunting a runner over when there was already one out in the inning, except when American League pitchers had to bat. It is worth noting, however, that with a runner on second base and first base open, including with nobody out, Weaver’s Orioles laid down a total of only 11 sacrifice bunts in the six years from 1977 to 1982, compared to 32 in the four years from 1973 (the beginning of the DH) to 1976. In this circumstance, after 1977, Weaver was most clearly not of a mind to sacrifice an out to get a runner already on second over to third; better to try to drive him home with a hit.

Weaver’s disdain of the sacrifice bunt was further validated by the Orioles’ routinely poor percentage in successfully laying them down. The Orioles had a worse success rate in sacrifice attempts than the league average every one of Weaver’s 14 full seasons at the helm, generally far below average. Weaver’s Orioles actually attempted 112 more sacrifice bunts than the average....

Weaver himself wrote: “Since a manager should only have those hitters bunt who have the skill, about 80 percent of your sacrifices should be successful.”9 Mastering the bunt may not have been part of the famed “Orioles Way,” but the Orioles’ frequent inability to bunt successfully certainly made going for the base hit—or better yet, the home run—a more compelling option.”

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