Adding quality players

[Safelykept]

Jesus Aguilar took 25 at bats at first base and 4 as PH The rest were at DH so he took way more at bats from Tyler Nevin than he did from Stowers, which is why he was brought in. As for Vavra he impeded his own development they tried him at multiple positions they did not like his  defense He might be a decent OBP guy But very little power and thus .677 OPS nice org depth piece no tlikely to make the opening day 26.

[Roll Tide]

1 hour ago, Safelykept said:

Jesus Aguilar took 25 at bats at first base and 4 as PH The rest were at DH so he took way more at bats from Tyler Nevin than he did from Stowers, which is why he was brought in. As for Vavra he impeded his own development they tried him at multiple positions they did not like his  defense He might be a decent OBP guy But very little power and thus .677 OPS nice org depth piece no tlikely to make the opening day 26.

Stowers couldn’t have DH?

[owknows]

2 hours ago, Ohfan67 said:

I did not like these acquisitions either, but “impeded the development” is an overstatement. Aquilar played in 16 games with the Orioles and Phillips appeared in a whopping 8 games for the Orioles. Again, I didn’t like the acquisitions either, but those acquisitions meant very little if really anything in terms of the playing time for Vavra and Stowers. They were attempts at catching a little lightening in the bottle that failed like most of those attempts do.  The Orioles would have given most of those at bats to other players over Stowers and Vavra even without the acquisitions IMO.  The Orioles were definitely not trying to maximize at bats for those guys. 

I think my original point was that continuing to play Odor after the all-star break, in addition to the acquisitions of Phillips and Aguilar, were bad moves. And that they impeded the development of Stowers and Vavra.

By my count, that's 237 at bats that could have done to Stowers and Vavra.

That's a significant impediment to their development. If they had chosen to play other players without giving a significant portion of those AB's to Stowers and Vavra I would have questioned that too.

It was also a net negative impact to the Orioles playoff chances.

 

[Ohfan67]

2 hours ago, owknows said:

I think my original point was that continuing to play Odor after the all-star break, in addition to the acquisitions of Phillips and Aguilar, were bad moves. And that they impeded the development of Stowers and Vavra.

By my count, that's 237 at bats that could have done to Stowers and Vavra.

That's a significant impediment to their development. If they had chosen to play other players without giving a significant portion of those AB's to Stowers and Vavra I would have questioned that too.

It was also a net negative impact to the Orioles playoff chances.

 

Whatever their reasoning, the Orioles had at bats to give to Vavra and Stowers and they didn’t. I definitely don’t think it was because of the acquisitions. But I’m really picking on a minor detail. I hated that Odor got as many at bats as he did, especially the second half, and I didn’t like those worthless and low probability additions. But I think the Orioles made their decision to not give at bats to Vavra and Stowers basically independent  of acquiring those two guys. Or rather it was the other way around…the Orioles decided they weren’t going to invest at bats in Vavra and Stowers and then tried the low probability lightening in a bottle approach to eek out a few more wins. Either way it doesn’t seem that the Orioles are big believers in V&S. 
 

I hope Vavra and Stowers get more chances to play next year and do well. Or get more of a chance if they end up on other teams. 

[Ohfan67]

P.s.  But in the end the addition of those two guys didn’t consume a lot of at bats. I think the moves were more irritating than their actual negative impacts.  Odor’s playing time was the more serious sin IMO. Not really disagreeing with you….mainly avoiding doing after Christmas dinner dishes.  

[Frobby]

During the time Vavra was with the team, they went 18-9 when he started, 15-21 when he didn’t.   With Stowers, the team was 13-9 when he started, 9-13 when he didn’t once he joined the team permanently (i.e., excluding the series in Toronto where he replaced Santander).   

[spiritof66]

I have spent much less time reading these posts and speculating on the Orioles’ post-season moves than in seasons past. That reflects in part some personal issues (including an unpleasant, and continuing, encounter with Covid-19). But it’s also because I find it frustrating, even demoralizing, to read the many well-thought-out proposals on this board, and elsewhere, for acquiring the kind of veteran talent that might make the Orioles a post-season team in 2023 and a legitimate contender beginning in 2024. What I’m about to say may have been presented somewhere in posts that I’ve missed, but I don’t think so.

The problem is that all these proposals look at the Orioles as a “normal” team that’s trying to win on a limited budget, has enough young talent to make that a real possibility, and is eager to make moves that would push it toward contention. It sure looks like Mike Elias would like to acquire gap-filling talent. I think John Angelos was and is willing to add to the puny 2023 payroll, maybe around $30 to $35 million through acquisitions of veterans, in addition to the increase from maturation increases for in-control players. As an aside, I don’t believe Elias is willing yet to acquire veteran talent by trading young talent that might blossom into stardom. Elias has never made decisions about parting with young talent, and I strongly suspect he’s afraid to make the wrong call on a Westburg or Cowser or Ortiz until he sees more of them.

To understand the Orioles’ recent decisions, I think you have to look beyond Elias to consider what’s going on with the team, including the peculiar ownership situation, the ongoing dispute between John and Lou Angelos, the team’s tenuous relationship with MLB, Peter Angelos’s estate plan as described in Lou’s complaint, and the team’s recent retention of investment bankers. I’ll try to be brief about the key underlying fact: promptly after Peter Angelos dies, the Orioles will be sold, and sale negotiations may already be ongoing since the conditions for that sale are two unavoidable events: death and taxes. I’ve been saying for five years or so that the Orioles would be sold soon after Peter Angelos’s death, and for a while there was plenty of pushback. In the interest of brevity, I’m assuming that nobody who has looked at the situation recently still questions that will happen. (In fact, I’m pretty sure that in 2020 MLB and the Angeloses reached an agreement requiring the sale of the team upon Peter’s death, in exchange for MLB not forcing a sale before that time, as it could have.)

Although he’s fully in charge for the moment, John Angelos probably doesn’t look at the Orioles as “his” team. His father owns it, his mother controls it, and when he inherits half of it (at a time he doesn’t control) his partial ownership, shared 50-50 with Lou, will be brief and potentially acrimonious. I’m sure John would like to improve the team and get it to the post-season while he's calling the shots. But I also believe that’s a short-term, secondary goal for him, and that his first priority is to put the team in the best possible posture for a sale. We don’t know when Peter Angelos, now 93½, will move on, and therefore don’t know when that sale will take place, or even whether the Angeloses have a good idea of that timing. John Angelos’s recent actions imply that he believes the sale is not more than a year or two away, but who knows?

The conventional wisdom among buyers and sellers of MLB teams has been that a purchaser prefers to take on as little in long-term player salary obligations as possible, and that he will pay more for a team whose cupboard is relatively bare of future salary commitments. (I learned about that preference years ago, in connection with the prospective sale of a couple of teams. My direct knowledge of this stuff is far from current, but I’d be surprised if this preference has changed. It’s probably gotten even stronger as long-term, big-dollar contracts have gotten more numerous, costlier and lengthier.)

For purposes of illustration: when the Phillies signed Trea Turner for eleven years at a flat $27.2 million per year, they understood that, optimistically ignoring the risk of serious injury, they likely were turning shortstop (or possibly, another infield position) over to Turner for more than a decade, and that in some of the later years they’d be paying Trea more than his production would justify, maybe even paying him I the later years to come off the bench or not to play at all. If the Phillies were to be sold in the next couple of years, the size and length of the team’s commitment to Turner would de-value the team for most bidders. Each of those prospective buyers will believe that he and his management team have unmatched acumen in evaluating talent and negotiating contracts, and would prefer not to have a decision about a key position or a big chunk of its payroll made for him. If he’s going to spend money on a star shortstop, including money that will poorly spent in the later years of a contract), he wants to make the decisions about who that shortstop will be and how long he’ll be around.

I have little doubt that Goldman Sachs advised John Angelos that if he wants to make the team as attractive as possible to buyers, the Orioles should minimize or avoid long-term payroll commitments that would significantly limit the ability of the next owner to make decisions about whom to play or how to allocate the team’s payroll. Of course, following that advice has had the additional advantage of saving Angelos money in the next year or two, since it’s become so difficult to sign the highest-paid stars for a season or two. John strikes me as a simple – not stupid, but simple, as in straightforward and uncomplicated – and he may have decided to take that advice and its money-saving consequences to its extreme.

The inference that I draw from the available facts is that John Angelos’s strong focus on a near-term sale of the Orioles has severely hampered Elias’ ability to sign guys who could really help the team. I’m guessing that Elias is precluded from offering any free agent a contract that runs beyond 2024, and there may well be some limit even on 2024 commitments. (Angelos might approve of a longer deal that would look attractive to a future buyer because it’s priced well under-market, but that ain’t happening.) This off-season, there are few potential difference-makers willing to forgo security and bet on themselves by signing short-term contracts. That has put Elias, the Orioles and us fans in a pretty tight spot: there just aren’t free agents who can really help the team and can be signed within those constraints. That’s why we’re seeing the Orioles settle for middling talents like Gibson, Frazier, McCann and Givens:  they’re among the few free agents who will take short-term deals, and in each case Elias believes they’re better than what we’ve got. He’s definitely right on McCann. We’ll see about the others.

I've been unable to enjoy very much reading about all the possible deals that might actually help the team – though there are fewer and fewer such opportunities still out there – when, as I see it, the team’s decision-maker wouldn't possibly approve them because it would cost him a few bucks out of the hundreds of millions he’ll be rolling in (after estate taxes) before long.  Obviously, anyone can disagree with my reading of the situation, but if so I’d appreciate another explanation of why the Orioles have entered into only one-year commitments while talented veterans who might have helped them much more have signed elsewhere.

Hey, I forgot to add this. Have a great 2023, everyone. It's been a while since I looked forward to an Orioles season this much. Seeing new faces, following the few veterans, a full season for the 2022 call-ups, watching what happens with the infield (Who's on third? Well, if he's on third, who's at short? I don't know, but there's a long line of guys hanging out at second, and Odor's not one of them!), and winning a lot of games. 

 

Edited December 26, 2022 by spiritof66

[OriolesMagic83]

2 hours ago, spiritof66 said:

I have spent much less time reading these posts and speculating on the Orioles’ post-season moves than in seasons past. That reflects in part some personal issues (including an unpleasant, and continuing, encounter with Covid-19). But it’s also because I find it frustrating, even demoralizing, to read the many well-thought-out proposals on this board, and elsewhere, for acquiring the kind of veteran talent that might make the Orioles a post-season team in 2023 and a legitimate contender beginning in 2024. What I’m about to say may have been presented somewhere in posts that I’ve missed, but I don’t think so.

The problem is that all these proposals look at the Orioles as a “normal” team that’s trying to win on a limited budget, has enough young talent to make that a real possibility, and is eager to make moves that would push it toward contention. It sure looks like Mike Elias would like to acquire gap-filling talent. I think John Angelos was and is willing to add to the puny 2023 payroll, maybe around $30 to $35 million through acquisitions of veterans, in addition to the increase from maturation increases for in-control players. As an aside, I don’t believe Elias is willing yet to acquire veteran talent by trading young talent that might blossom into stardom. Elias has never made decisions about parting with young talent, and I strongly suspect he’s afraid to make the wrong call on a Westburg or Cowser or Ortiz until he sees more of them.

To understand the Orioles’ recent decisions, I think you have to look beyond Elias to consider what’s going on with the team, including the peculiar ownership situation, the ongoing dispute between John and Lou Angelos, the team’s tenuous relationship with MLB, Peter Angelos’s estate plan as described in Lou’s complaint, and the team’s recent retention of investment bankers. I’ll try to be brief about the key underlying fact: promptly after Peter Angelos dies, the Orioles will be sold, and sale negotiations may already be ongoing since the conditions for that sale are two unavoidable events: death and taxes. I’ve been saying for five years or so that the Orioles would be sold soon after Peter Angelos’s death, and for a while there was plenty of pushback. In the interest of brevity, I’m assuming that nobody who has looked at the situation recently still questions that will happen. (In fact, I’m pretty sure that in 2020 MLB and the Angeloses reached an agreement requiring the sale of the team upon Peter’s death, in exchange for MLB not forcing a sale before that time, as it could have.)

Although he’s fully in charge for the moment, John Angelos probably doesn’t look at the Orioles as “his” team. His father owns it, his mother controls it, and when he inherits half of it (at a time he doesn’t control) his partial ownership, shared 50-50 with Lou, will be brief and potentially acrimonious. I’m sure John would like to improve the team and get it to the post-season while he's calling the shots. But I also believe that’s a short-term, secondary goal for him, and that his first priority is to put the team in the best possible posture for a sale. We don’t know when Peter Angelos, now 93½, will move on, and therefore don’t know when that sale will take place, or even whether the Angeloses have a good idea of that timing. John Angelos’s recent actions imply that he believes the sale is not more than a year or two away, but who knows?

The conventional wisdom among buyers and sellers of MLB teams has been that a purchaser prefers to take on as little in long-term player salary obligations as possible, and that he will pay more for a team whose cupboard is relatively bare of future salary commitments. (I learned about that preference years ago, in connection with the prospective sale of a couple of teams. My direct knowledge of this stuff is far from current, but I’d be surprised if this preference has changed. It’s probably gotten even stronger as long-term, big-dollar contracts have gotten more numerous, costlier and lengthier.)

For purposes of illustration: when the Phillies signed Trea Turner for eleven years at a flat $27.2 million per year, they understood that, optimistically ignoring the risk of serious injury, they likely were turning shortstop (or possibly, another infield position) over to Turner for more than a decade, and that in some of the later years they’d be paying Trea more than his production would justify, maybe even paying him I the later years to come off the bench or not to play at all. If the Phillies were to be sold in the next couple of years, the size and length of the team’s commitment to Turner would de-value the team for most bidders. Each of those prospective buyers will believe that he and his management team have unmatched acumen in evaluating talent and negotiating contracts, and would prefer not to have a decision about a key position or a big chunk of its payroll made for him. If he’s going to spend money on a star shortstop, including money that will poorly spent in the later years of a contract), he wants to make the decisions about who that shortstop will be and how long he’ll be around.

I have little doubt that Goldman Sachs advised John Angelos that if he wants to make the team as attractive as possible to buyers, the Orioles should minimize or avoid long-term payroll commitments that would significantly limit the ability of the next owner to make decisions about whom to play or how to allocate the team’s payroll. Of course, following that advice has had the additional advantage of saving Angelos money in the next year or two, since it’s become so difficult to sign the highest-paid stars for a season or two. John strikes me as a simple – not stupid, but simple, as in straightforward and uncomplicated – and he may have decided to take that advice and its money-saving consequences to its extreme.

The inference that I draw from the available facts is that John Angelos’s strong focus on a near-term sale of the Orioles has severely hampered Elias’ ability to sign guys who could really help the team. I’m guessing that Elias is precluded from offering any free agent a contract that runs beyond 2024, and there may well be some limit even on 2024 commitments. (Angelos might approve of a longer deal that would look attractive to a future buyer because it’s priced well under-market, but that ain’t happening.) This off-season, there are few potential difference-makers willing to forgo security and bet on themselves by signing short-term contracts. That has put Elias, the Orioles and us fans in a pretty tight spot: there just aren’t free agents who can really help the team and can be signed within those constraints. That’s why we’re seeing the Orioles settle for middling talents like Gibson, Frazier, McCann and Givens:  they’re among the few free agents who will take short-term deals, and in each case Elias believes they’re better than what we’ve got. He’s definitely right on McCann. We’ll see about the others.

I've been unable to enjoy very much reading about all the possible deals that might actually help the team – though there are fewer and fewer such opportunities still out there – when, as I see it, the team’s decision-maker wouldn't possibly approve them because it would cost him a few bucks out of the hundreds of millions he’ll be rolling in (after estate taxes) before long.  Obviously, anyone can disagree with my reading of the situation, but if so I’d appreciate another explanation of why the Orioles have entered into only one-year commitments while talented veterans who might have helped them much more have signed elsewhere.

Hey, I forgot to add this. Have a great 2023, everyone. It's been a while since I looked forward to an Orioles season this much. Seeing new faces, following the few veterans, a full season for the 2022 call-ups, watching what happens with the infield (Who's on third? Well, if he's on third, who's at short? I don't know, but there's a long line of guys hanging out at second, and Odor's not one of them!), and winning a lot of games. 

 

It seems John isn't too interested in cutting into his profits from the team.  He knows the gravy train ends when Peter dies.  He'll have to figure out how to make it on a few hundred mill.

[Roll Tide]

9 hours ago, Frobby said:

During the time Vavra was with the team, they went 18-9 when he started, 15-21 when he didn’t.   With Stowers, the team was 13-9 when he started, 9-13 when he didn’t once he joined the team permanently (i.e., excluding the series in Toronto where he replaced Santander).   

I’m sure they knew the stats and ignored them. Some get mad when I say they weren’t trying to win. This leadership group claims to be analytically superior.  But, somehow didn’t know that Odor was such an anchor? Then they had the announcing crew pump us with his value to the team as if we are fools.