What are the Chances?

[Arthur_Bryant]

I generally agree with your post, but this sentence doesn't sit well.

If Hobgood busts, it's bad on almost any level regardless of what anyone else does. There were too many other legit targets at #4 that seemed pretty safe (Matzek - my favorite, Green - a safe bet to be a decent ML player, Wheeler - the other cheap but electric alternative).

I like everything I hear about the guy, but it was clearly a risky pick. I don't think forgiveness for missing on such a pick will be easy unless Jordan overwhelmingly hits on many of those other guys. Even then, there will be a sense of "what were you thinking" if he misses. It's just too high of a position for a good team who needs young players to miss.

In the end, Hobgood is one pick, and the draft is all of one piece. His pick helped to determine the rest of the draft, and since he was known to be a quick and cheap sign, nobody can say how it would have gone down if someone besides Hobgood had been taken at #4.

In a situation where the budget is limited, you can't take the pieces apart and judge them individually. It all hangs together, and has to be judged overall. If the O's get two solid #2-#3 SPs out of that class, then the draft will be a success--a big success--and there's a good chance that the Hobgood selection helped to make it possible, even if he never gets out of Frederick.

It's not that I'm a fan of Hobgood. I just don't know about him individually. I'm not a big fan yet of any of the individual picks. But I am a big fan of the way the O's took calculated risks across the board.

[Lucky Jim]

In the end, Hobgood is one pick, and the draft is all of one piece. His pick helped to determine the rest of the draft, and since he was known to be a quick and cheap sign, nobody can say how it would have gone down if someone besides Hobgood had been taken at #4.

In a situation where the budget is limited, you can't take the pieces apart and judge them individually. It all hangs together, and has to be judged overall. If the O's get two solid #2-#3 SPs out of that class, then the draft will be a success--a big success--and there's a good chance that the Hobgood selection helped to make it possible, even if he never gets out of Frederick.

It's not that I'm a fan of Hobgood. I just don't know about him individually. I'm not a big fan yet of any of the individual picks. But I am a big fan of the way the O's took calculated risks across the board.

Yeah. The money isn't the only constraint. There's also time. So Jordan choosing Hobgood, who figured not to be a difficult sign, allowed him the time and energy to negotiate w/ a number of difficult signs across the board. It's not dispositive or anything, but I think that was clearly one of the factors. So, to an extent, you have to look at the draft as a whole, or at least factor in the alternatives at #4 that would have provided that same luxury.

[Stotle]

Yeah. The money isn't the only constraint. There's also time. So Jordan choosing Hobgood, who figured not to be a difficult sign, allowed him the time and energy to negotiate w/ a number of difficult signs across the board. It's not dispositive or anything, but I think that was clearly one of the factors. So, to an extent, you have to look at the draft as a whole, or at least factor in the alternatives at #4 that would have provided that same luxury.

Agreed. And this is, I think, the point in the analysis where you can start to frame the idea of a new "draft strategy" in 2009. You weigh Hobgood as a pick, and then the other picks that were made AS WELL AS similar picks that could have been made (I'll generalize by calling these "tough signs available at a slot below where their potential ceiling might warrant).

So the analysis becomes 2-fold:

1) Is the strategy a good one. Is this idea of signing a "Hobgood" to allow for the drafting, negotiating and evetual signing of players V - Z better than signing a "Matzek" (supposed tough sign, good talent) or a "Wheeler" (a little more difficult sign -- August -- but much better room for growth) or a "Green" (college position player with room for growth and August signing difficulty) or a "Tim Wheeler" (college positional player below-slot with solid ML-average projection).

2) Is BAL targeting the right players V - Z to take advantage of a relatively inexpensive and early "Hobgood" selection/signing?

[Lucky Jim]

Agreed. And this is, I think, the point in the analysis where you can start to frame the idea of a new "draft strategy" in 2009. You weigh Hobgood as a pick, and then the other picks that were made AS WELL AS similar picks that could have been made (I'll generalize by calling these "tough signs available at a slot below where their potential ceiling might warrant).

So the analysis becomes 2-fold:

1) Is the strategy a good one. Is this idea of signing a "Hobgood" to allow for the drafting, negotiating and evetual signing of players V - Z better than signing a "Matzek" (supposed tough sign, good talent) or a "Wheeler" (a little more difficult sign -- August -- but much better room for growth) or a "Green" (college position player with room for growth and August signing difficulty) or a "Tim Wheeler" (college positional player below-slot with solid ML-average projection).

2) Is BAL targeting the right players V - Z to take advantage of a relatively inexpensive and early "Hobgood" selection/signing?

Yep. And they clearly guessed wrong (a bit) about the time and money that some of the picks would cost. Perhaps they were being conservative, but it's a consideration in judging their draft.

[Arthur_Bryant]

Yeah. The money isn't the only constraint. There's also time. So Jordan choosing Hobgood, who figured not to be a difficult sign, allowed him the time and energy to negotiate w/ a number of difficult signs across the board. It's not dispositive or anything, but I think that was clearly one of the factors. So, to an extent, you have to look at the draft as a whole, or at least factor in the alternatives at #4 that would have provided that same luxury.

Yes, and there's also the potential uncertainty of how much you'll have available for the lower-round overslots. Getting that top pick settled immediately made things much clearer than if those negotiations had dragged on.

I don't think that any of the reasonable alternatives at No. 5 would have provided this flexibility in price and certainty. Matzek, Zack Wheeler, and Green all signed in mid-August, and at least the two pitchers were overslot by about $1 MM, I think.

[Stotle]

Yes, and there's also the potential uncertainty of how much you'll have available for the lower-round overslots. Getting that top pick settled immediately made things much clearer than if those negotiations had dragged on.

I don't think that any of the reasonable alternatives at No. 5 would have provided this flexibility in price and certainty. Matzek, Zack Wheeler, and Green all signed in mid-August, and at least the two pitchers were overslot by about $1 MM, I think.

This is running close to creating facts to support a case. In honesty, with some exceptions, we aren't aware of how long it wold have taken to sign a lot of these players. It's possible some teams (particularly with pitchers) did not plan on having their draftee log much time last summer, and did not turn its attention to signing the player until later in the summer (aside from the mandatory token offer of a contract in June).

Your statement reads as if Hobgood was the only logical choice if BAL was shooting to sign a bunch of overslot players later in the draft. We know this isn't true, as BAL certainly wasn't the only organization to act in this manner. Perhaps the names you threw out were tough signs -- perhaps Wheeler agrees to a deal more quickly if BAL puts all of its attention into getting the deal done. We just don't know. And that is taking out of the equation a handful of other 1st-round talents that could have been "quick signs" if that is what was required/desired.

[Stotle]

Yes, and there's also the potential uncertainty of how much you'll have available for the lower-round overslots. Getting that top pick settled immediately made things much clearer than if those negotiations had dragged on.

I don't think that any of the reasonable alternatives at No. 5 would have provided this flexibility in price and certainty. Matzek, Zack Wheeler, and Green all signed in mid-August, and at least the two pitchers were overslot by about $1 MM, I think.

Also, BAL (for all intents and purposes) didn't expect to get Givens done, but came up with the money for him even after signing Coffey/Ohlman. I think that goes a bit towards disproving that you need to have a set decided in order to know how much you have for overslots later in the draft. 900K is quite a bit of wiggle-room to "throw on" at the last second.

[clarence]

Great thread.

To offer my two cents, a team in the O's position (competing in a division with two giants) is making a terrible decision to not take complete advantage of a 5th pick, and more importantly, the upcoming 3rd pick. You have to take the best player at that slot and not be thinking about your budget come the 33rd round. This would be the kind of neglect to the franchise that could push a lot of people away who are willing to overlook most of the franchises problems. This would be an unacceptable practice, imo. This is an instance where I will agree with some that I never agree with and say we aren't the Royals or Marlins, spend some money.

From reading Jordan, didn't he believe that Hobgood WAS the best available talent at that slot? Do you believe him? I'm going to, because the alternative is feeling sick and disgusted.

[Lucky Jim]

Great thread.

To offer my two cents, a team in the O's position (competing in a division with two giants) is making a terrible decision to not take complete advantage of a 5th pick, and more importantly, the upcoming 3rd pick. You have to take the best player at that slot and not be thinking about your budget come the 33rd round. This would be the kind of neglect to the franchise that could push a lot of people away who are willing to overlook most of the franchises problems. This would be an unacceptable practice, imo. This is an instance where I will agree with some that I never agree with and say we aren't the Royals or Marlins, spend some money.

From reading Jordan, didn't he believe that Hobgood WAS the best available talent at that slot? Do you believe him? I'm going to, because the alternative is feeling sick and disgusted.

I don't understand this perspective at all. Obviously 1:1 a top-5 pick is a more valuable than a later pick due to probability of success, but that really starts to dwindle when you deal w/ multiple picks at overslot.

[Stotle]

I don't understand this perspective at all. Obviously 1:1 a top-5 pick is a more valuable than a later pick due to probability of success, but that really starts to dwindle when you deal w/ multiple picks at overslot.

I think it's a defensible complaint. It's actually the crux of the issue -- is a team better off sacrificing some talent up top if it means bringing in a higher volume of high-risk/high-reward (still not comfortable that is the correct term) selections later on.

[Arthur_Bryant]

Also, BAL (for all intents and purposes) didn't expect to get Givens done, but came up with the money for him even after signing Coffey/Ohlman. I think that goes a bit towards disproving that you need to have a set decided in order to know how much you have for overslots later in the draft. 900K is quite a bit of wiggle-room to "throw on" at the last second.

Good point on Givens. I wonder if the money was already budgeted, or if it was a late production from Jordan through AM, or maybe out of discretionary funds--if there is such a thing as discretionary money in the Orioles' scheme of things.

There's a lot we don't know, and I'll be the first to know that the reality could well blow holes in my view of things.

I would be interested to know, though.

[LookinUp]

I think it's a defensible complaint. It's actually the crux of the issue -- is a team better off sacrificing some talent up top if it means bringing in a higher volume of high-risk/high-reward (still not comfortable that is the correct term) selections later on.

Sure it's valid. An odds maker could probably make a better case than me.

What are the odds of having a great draft? Matzek plus 5 overslotters or Hobgood plus 7 overslotters?

I'm guessing that the odds of a blue chipper hitting (say top 5 talents in a draft) are significantly higher than a sub-blue chipper hitting, and immensely higher than young and/or injured overslotters hitting.

This, of course, is an analysis in a vaccuum. Luckily, Jordan doesn't operate in a vaccuum (by the way, I have no idea how to spell that word, lol). Jordan can make a call like this to maximize his odds.

So, in a nutshell, while I generally disagree with the notion that it's worthwhile to take an easy sign so you can increase the chances of getting overslotters, I defer to Jordan on whether it was a good strategy in this particular circumstance.

As always with the draft, time will tell.

[Arthur_Bryant]

What are the odds of having a great draft? Matzek plus 5 overslotters or Hobgood plus 7 overslotters?

I'm guessing that the odds of a blue chipper hitting (say top 5 talents in a draft) are significantly higher than a sub-blue chipper hitting, and immensely higher than young and/or injured overslotters hitting.

It is evident now that the choice is between Matzek+5 vs. Hobgood+7. But that was not so obvious on June 15, with Boras as Matzek's agent (I believe). Boras was floating some crazy numbers (as always) and there was no way to know where he would settle, which is probably part of the reason Matzek slipped as far as he did.

[hobbycars]

Agreed. And this is, I think, the point in the analysis where you can start to frame the idea of a new "draft strategy" in 2009. You weigh Hobgood as a pick, and then the other picks that were made AS WELL AS similar picks that could have been made (I'll generalize by calling these "tough signs available at a slot below where their potential ceiling might warrant).

So the analysis becomes 2-fold:

1) Is the strategy a good one. Is this idea of signing a "Hobgood" to allow for the drafting, negotiating and evetual signing of players V - Z better than signing a "Matzek" (supposed tough sign, good talent) or a "Wheeler" (a little more difficult sign -- August -- but much better room for growth) or a "Green" (college position player with room for growth and August signing difficulty) or a "Tim Wheeler" (college positional player below-slot with solid ML-average projection).

2) Is BAL targeting the right players V - Z to take advantage of a relatively inexpensive and early "Hobgood" selection/signing?

Sir-I have been reading this board for a while and want to thank you for your always insight posts. Really, thank you and I for one, was very disappointed with the Hobgood selection. I still don't understand why our 2nd rounder is playing shortstop instead of pitching.

[hobbycars]

Sure it's valid. An odds maker could probably make a better case than me.

What are the odds of having a great draft? Matzek plus 5 overslotters or Hobgood plus 7 overslotters?

I'm guessing that the odds of a blue chipper hitting (say top 5 talents in a draft) are significantly higher than a sub-blue chipper hitting, and immensely higher than young and/or injured overslotters hitting.

This, of course, is an analysis in a vaccuum. Luckily, Jordan doesn't operate in a vaccuum (by the way, I have no idea how to spell that word, lol). Jordan can make a call like this to maximize his odds.

So, in a nutshell, while I generally disagree with the notion that it's worthwhile to take an easy sign so you can increase the chances of getting overslotters, I defer to Jordan on whether it was a good strategy in this particular circumstance.

As always with the draft, time will tell.

Well said sir-You and Stotle really make reading worthwhile. Thank you.